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Abstract
We develop a deep learning model of multi-period mortgage risk and use it to ana-
lyze an unprecedented dataset of origination and monthly performance records for over
120 million mortgages originated across the US between 1995 and 2014. Our estimators
of term structures of conditional probabilities of prepayment, foreclosure and various
states of delinquency incorporate the dynamics of a large number of loan-specific as well
as macroeconomic variables down to the zip-code level. The estimators uncover the
highly nonlinear nature of the relationship between the variables and borrower behav-
ior, especially prepayment. They also highlight the effects of local economic conditions
on borrower behavior. State unemployment has the greatest explanatory power among
all variables, offering strong evidence of the tight connection between housing finance
markets and the macroeconomy. The sensitivity of a borrower to changes in unemploy-
ment strongly depends upon current unemployment. It also significantly varies across
the entire borrower population, which highlights the interaction of unemployment and
many other variables. These findings have important implications for mortgage-backed
security investors, rating agencies, and housing finance policymakers.
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1 Introduction
The empirical mortgage literature identifies a number of variables that help predict mortgage
credit and prepayment risk, including borrower credit score and income, loan-to-value ratio,
loan age, interest rates, and housing prices.1 To ensure econometric tractability, researchers
often impose restrictions on the empirical models they use to study the role of various
risk factors. Importantly, the relationship between factors and mortgage performance is
typically constrained to be of a pre-specified form, with the standard choice being linear.
The mortgage performance data, however, do not support such restrictions. They indicate
the presence of nonlinear effects. For example, Figure 1 highlights the complex relationship
that exists between the empirical prepayment rate and the prepayment incentive, given by
the initial mortgage rate minus the market rate.2 Consider the sensitivity of prepayment
rates to changes in incentive, which is a measure of the economic importance of the incentive
variable. The sensitivity varies significantly, both in magnitude as well as sign, depending
on the incentive. The widely-used linear empirical models can be mis-specified because they
pretend the sensitivity is a constant. The sensitivity estimates generated by these models can
therefore misrepresent the influence of risk factors. This can make it difficult to draw valid
economic conclusions from these models regarding the influence on borrower behavior of key
variables such as interest rates, unemployment, and housing prices, which play a major role
in housing finance markets and the wider economy.
This paper proposes a nonlinear approach to address this important issue. We develop
a deep learning model of mortgage credit and prepayment risk in which the relationship
between risk factors and loan performance is not predicated on a pre-specified form as in
prior empirical models. In our approach, this relationship is entirely dictated by the data
themselves, minimizing model mis-specification and bias of variable sensitivity estimates.
Any type of behavior is permitted, including nonlinear behavior such as interactions between
multiple variables. An unprecedented dataset of over 120 million mortgages enables us to
accurately estimate this behavior. The data include prime and subprime loans in more
than 30,000 zip-codes across the nation, a wide range of mortgage products, and detailed
origination and monthly performance records for each loan. We study over 3.5 billion loan-
month observations that span 1995 to 2014, and examine the role of a broad set of novel
and conventional risk factors, including loan and borrower-specific variables as well as time-
varying macroeconomic and demographic variables down to the zip-code level (see Tables 1,
5, and 7 for a complete list of variables).
1See, for example, Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham & Capone (1990), Curley & Guttentag
(1974), Deng, Quigley & Van Order (2000), Gau (1978), Green & Shoven (1986), Schwartz & Torous (1993),
Titman & Torous (1989), Vandell (1978), Vandell (1992), von Furstenberg (1969), Webb (1982), and others.
2This is based on loan performance data described in Section 2.
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Figure 1: Empirical monthly prepayment rate vs. prepayment incentive.
Our empirical analysis reveals that many variables have a highly nonlinear influence on
borrower behavior which prior work does not address. Prepayment events are especially
affected. Variable interactions, including those between more than two factors, are found
to represent a significant component of the nonlinear effects. An interaction between vari-
ables occurs when the sensitivity of loan performance to a variable also depends on one or
more other variables. As an important example, consider the impact of state unemployment
rates, which we find to have the greatest explanatory power for borrower behavior among all
variables studied. Figure 2 shows fitted conditional prepayment probabilities versus state un-
employment rates, for a borrower with a FICO credit score of 630 (the median for subprime
borrowers in our data set) as well as a borrower with a FICO score of 730 (the median for
prime borrowers). The relationship between prepayment and unemployment is highly non-
linear, and strongly depends on the borrower’s credit score, indicating an interaction between
unemployment and credit score. All else equal, high-FICO borrowers are estimated to prepay
at significantly higher rates than low-FICO borrowers in all unemployment scenarios. The
“prepayment gap” between high- and low-FICO borrowers tends to widen as unemployment
grows. With low unemployment between 5 and 7 percent, low- and high-FICO borrowers
are equally sensitive to changes in unemployment. However, with moderate unemployment
between 7 and 11 percent, low-FICO borrowers are significantly more sensitive to changes
in unemployment than high-FICO borrowers. While high-FICO borrower prepayment is
essentially flat in this unemployment range, low-FICO borrower prepayment decreases sig-
nificantly with unemployment rising from 7 to 11 percent. The prepayment sensitivities of
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Figure 2: Fitted monthly prepayment probability vs. state unemployment.
high- and low-FICO borrowers converge as unemployment rises above 11 percent.
Unemployment is found to interact in nontrivial ways with a range of other variables
including loan-to-value ratios, mortgage rates, and house price appreciation. The effects are
not limited to prepayment risk but also pertain to the credit risk of a mortgage borrower.
For example, Figure 3 shows fitted conditional delinquency probabilities versus zip-code level
house price appreciation since loan origination, for two state unemployment scenarios. As
expected, the probability of a borrower to fall behind payment drops when house prices
appreciate and borrower equity increases in value. However, the behavior is not linear. The
sensitivity of the delinquency rate to changes in house prices strongly depends on the ap-
preciation already realized. The higher that appreciation, the smaller is the reduction in
the delinquency rate in response to additional price increases. Moreover, the behavior of
the delinquency rate as a function of house price appreciation strongly depends on state
unemployment (an interaction effect). Unsurprisingly, the delinquency rate increases with
state unemployment. Interestingly, however, when state unemployment is high, the delin-
quency rate drops much more in response to an appreciation in house prices than when
unemployment is low. The gap between delinquency rates in different unemployment sce-
narios narrows as house prices increase, and vanishes completely when prices have doubled.
This means that labor market conditions hardly matter for borrower behavior after house
prices have sufficiently appreciated. This, in turn, suggests that home equity can insulate
borrowers from labor market shocks.
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Figure 3: Fitted monthly delinquency probability vs. house price appreciation.
Our findings yield important new insights into the interplay of borrower behavior and the
macroeconomy. They differ from the findings of Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham
& Capone (1990), Deng (1997), Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon & Hunt (2010),
Foote, Gerardi, Goette & Willen (2010) and others. These prior studies highlight loan-
level variables such as loan-to-value ratio, loan age, and credit score as major predictors
of borrower behavior. They assign a relatively limited role to unemployment. Foote et al.
(2010), for example, find no evidence for the influence of unemployment on prepayment.
Our results, which are based on a much longer sample period, imply that unemployment
dominates the aforementioned and all other variables considered in terms of explanatory
power for borrower behavior. This suggests a much tighter connection between housing
finance markets and the macroeconomy than previously thought.
The important role of unemployment implies that the loan-to-loan correlation due to
the exposure of borrowers to economic cycles can be substantial. This source of loan-to-
loan correlation is distinct from the foreclosure contagion channel studied by Anenberg &
Kung (2014), Campbell, Gigli & Pathak (2011), Towe & Lawley (2013), and others. We
control for the contagion channel by including as a variable the lagged foreclosure rate at the
zip-code level. The significance of loan-to-loan correlation due to the common exposure of
borrowers to economic cycles emphasizes the need for mortgage-backed security investors as
well as mortgage lenders to diversify mortgage risk geographically, beyond the conventional
borrower characteristics highlighted in the literature.
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The nonlinear nature of the relationship between unemployment and borrower behavior
entails that the sensitivity of a borrower to changes in unemployment strongly depends on the
prevailing unemployment rate as well as the borrower’s characteristics. For example, a 10%
drop in unemployment from 7% to 6.3% affects a given borrower differently than one from
10% to 9%. Moreover, due to multiple variable interactions, the effect varies very significantly
across the entire borrower population, not just across borrowers with different loan-to-value
ratios and credit scores as suggested by Elul et al. (2010) and Foote et al. (2010) in the case
of borrower default. This is important for mortgage-backed security investors, who need
to account for these effects when hedging their positions against macroeconomic volatility.
Rating agencies need to address the nonlinear behavior when assessing the exposure of
mortgage securities to adverse macroeconomic conditions. Many prior articles studying the
role of unemployment, for example Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham & Capone
(1990), Deng (1997) and others, ignore the pronounced nonlinear behavior by assuming that
the sensitivity of borrowers to changes in unemployment is constant and independent of all
other variables including borrower characteristics.
Our empirical results are based on a deep learning model for mortgage states over mul-
tiple periods. The model harnesses the unprecedented size of our sample set and the large
number of risk factors we examine (272 in total). It is designed to capture the nonlinear
relationships between variables and mortgage state probabilities present in the data. The
model distinguishes between multiple states, including current, 30 days past due, 60 days
past due, 90+ days past due, foreclosure, REO (real-estate-owned), and prepaid. It offers
likelihood estimators for the term structure of the full conditional transition probability
matrix for these states. The estimators incorporate the significant time-series variation of
the explanatory variables over the 20-year sample period as well as their future movements.
They are shown to yield superior out-of-sample predictions of multi-period mortgage risk at
the individual loan level as well as the mortgage pool level. We also demonstrate that they
enable the selection of performing mortgage investment portfolios. The tests indicate the
ability of the deep learning model to capture the stand-alone risk of a loan as well as the
substantial correlation that exists between the loans in a portfolio. The model’s predictive
accuracy suggests its usefulness for several important applications, including the valuation
of mortgage-backed securities as in Curley & Guttentag (1977), Schwartz & Torous (1989)
and Stanton & Wallace (2011).3
3The valuations generated by our model would harness the detailed data available for each of the under-
lying loans. This contrasts with alternative “top-down” valuation approaches such as Schwartz & Torous
(1989), McConnell & Singh (1994) and Boudoukh, Whitelaw, Richardson & Stanton (1997), who directly
model the aggregate behavior of a pool without reference to the pool constituents.
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Our deep learning model for mortgage state probabilities is a nonlinear extension of the
familiar logistic regression model, which is widely used in the empirical mortgage literature4
and beyond. It can be thought of as a logistic regression of recursively specified basis func-
tions that nonlinearly transform the explanatory variables and are learned from the data.
The model can also be represented by an interconnected set of input, output, and “hidden”
nodes, which is often called a neural network.5 The input nodes represent the explana-
tory variables while the output nodes represent the conditional probabilities of the different
mortgage states (current, 30 days late, prepaid, foreclosed, etc.). The hidden nodes connect
the input and output nodes, and represent the nonlinear transformations of input variables.
Given enough hidden nodes, a neural network can approximate arbitrarily well the true map-
ping between explanatory variables and conditional mortgage state probabilities.6 This of
course includes approximating nonlinear relations and interactions such as the product and
division of variables.
In particular, we examine deep neural networks, which have multiple layers of hidden
nodes. Deep architectures enable sparser representations of complex relationships than shal-
low networks with few hidden layers.7 Our fitting experiments with networks of different
depth indicate a strong preference for deeper networks, highlighting the existence of highly
nonlinear relationships and variable interactions in the mortgage data. The optimal net-
work architecture, determined via cross-validation methods, has five layers of hidden nodes,
each having between 140 and 200 nodes. We develop computationally efficient maximum
likelihood fitting algorithms that take advantage of recent advances in GPU parallel and
cloud computing. Overfitting is tightly controlled by regularization, dropout, and ensemble
modeling, and as a result is found to be insignificant.
The remainder of the introduction discusses the related literature. Section 2 examines
our dataset and performs some exploratory analyses that will inform the specification of
our deep learning model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses likelihood estimation for the deep
learning model. Section 5 reports our empirical results. Section 6 examines the out-of-sample
behavior of the deep learning model. Section 7 offers concluding remarks. There are several
technical appendices.
4See Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham & Capone (1990), and more recently, Agarwal, Amromin,
Ben-David, Chomsisengphet & Evanoff (2011), Agarwal, Chang & Yavaz (2012), Jiang, Nelson & Vytlacil
(2014), and Rajan, Seru & Vig (2015).
5For a broad introduction to deep learning, see White (1992) and Goodfellow, Bengio & Courville (2016).
6More precisely, a neural network can approximate arbitrarily well continuous functions on compact sets,
see Hornik, Stinchcombe & White (1989) and Hornik (1991).
7See Mallat (2016), Telgarsky (2016), Eldan & Shamir (2016), Bengio & LeCun (2007), and Montufar,
Pascanu, Cho & Bengio (2014).
7
1.1 Related Literature
There is a substantial empirical literature on mortgage delinquency and prepayment risk.
In early work, von Furstenberg (1969) establishes the influence on home mortgage default
rates of variables such as income, loan age, and loan-to-value ratio. Gau (1978), Vandell
(1978), Webb (1982), Campbell & Dietrich (1983) and others examine additional variables.
Commercial mortgage default is studied by Titman & Torous (1989) and Vandell (1992),
among others. Curley & Guttentag (1974) is an early study of prepayment rates. Green
& Shoven (1986) and Richard & Roll (1989) examine the influence of interest rates on
prepayments. Cunningham & Capone (1990), Schwartz & Torous (1993), and Deng (1997)
analyze the influence on default and prepayment of several loan-level and macro-economic
variables, recognizing the “competing” nature of default and prepayment events. Deng
et al. (2000) analyze the extent to which option theory can explain default and prepayment
behavior. Schwartz & Torous (1989) pioneered the use of empirical pool-level prepayment
models for the pricing of agency mortgage-backed securities. More recently, Stanton &
Wallace (2011) use empirical models of default and prepayment to price private-label MBS.
Chernov, Dunn & Longstaff (2016) estimate market-implied risk-neutral prepayment rates
and relate them to various explanatory variables.
This study of mortgage credit and prepayment risk represents a significant departure from
earlier work, in several respects. Our empirical analysis is based on an unprecedented dataset
of 120 million prime and subprime mortgages observed over the period 1995–2014. The afore-
mentioned prior work has examined much smaller samples (tens to hundreds of thousands of
loans), focusing on particular geographic regions, time periods, economic regimes, loan prod-
ucts, borrower profiles, and a limited set of loan-level and macro-economic risk factors. It is
unclear to what extent the empirical findings of these earlier studies can be generalized. Our
dataset includes about 70 percent of all US mortgages originated between 1995 and 2014,
and is the most comprehensive mortgage data set studied to date. It covers all product types,
including fixed-rate, adjustable-rate, hybrid, balloon, and other types of loans, and tracks
their performance during several economic cycles. With samples spanning two decades and
spread across over 30,000 zip codes, we are in a position to study the joint influence on
mortgage risk of a broad set of novel and conventional risk factors that describe a variety of
borrower and product characteristics as well as economic and demographic conditions down
to the zip-code level. Our results highlight the importance of the local economic conditions
that borrowers face, after controlling for the influence of the factors that prior studies have
identified as significant predictors of mortgage risk. In particular, we identify state unem-
ployment rates as the factor with the greatest explanatory power for borrower behavior.
Some prior studies, focusing on short sample periods and few controls, found unemployment
to be dominated by borrower variables (e.g., Deng (1997), Elul et al. (2010)) while others
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found little or no evidence for the influence of unemployment rates. For example, Foote et al.
(2010) found unemployment to be insignificant for prepayment. Our findings, being based
on the richest mortgage performance and covariate data sets studied to date, settle the im-
portant role played by unemployment. They provide strong evidence of the tight connection
between housing finance markets and the macroeconomy.
Our econometric model addresses the nonlinear relationships between borrower behavior
and risk factors that prior work has largely ignored. Most previous papers use logistic
regression (Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham & Hendershott (1986), Elul et al.
(2010), Agarwal et al. (2011), and others) and Cox proportional hazard models (Green &
Shoven (1986), Deng et al. (2000), Stanton & Wallace (2011), and others).8 These models
are also standard in the empirical corporate credit literature, see Campbell, Hilscher &
Szilagyi (2008), Duffie, Saita & Wang (2007), Shumway (2001), and several others. The
Cox models sometimes include a nonparametric baseline hazard function that can capture
a nonlinear influence of loan age on mortgage risk. Both Cox and logistic regression models
sometimes include quadratic or other nonlinear transformations of certain variables. For
example, Agarwal et al. (2012) use the squared loan age as risk factor in addition to loan
age itself, Elul et al. (2010) discretize continuous variables such as the loan-to-value ratio,
and Foote et al. (2010) include certain pairwise interaction terms. Unlike these extensions
of linear models, our deep learning model is inherently nonlinear. It captures all nonlinear
effects, including variable interactions of any order, that exist in the data. Our model
eliminates bias due to linear model mis-specification, and yields accurate estimates of the
economic significance of the explanatory variables. Moreover, it eliminates the need for
the econometrician to identify and specify the nonlinearities ahead of time. The practice
of using certain nonlinear transformations in a linear model requires the identification of
the variables to be transformed and the specification of the transformations to be used.
To this end, the researcher must systematically explore a potentially very large number of
possible relationships between variables and outcomes as well as interactions that might exist
between variables. This approach is impractical with more than just a few variables. Our
deep learning model automatically identifies all nonlinearities that are present in the data,
even in high-dimensional settings with many risk factors.
The fitted deep learning model provides a detailed picture of the nonlinear effects gov-
erning borrower behavior. We see exactly how important variables such as unemployment
rates, housing prices, and credit scores jointly influence borrower behavior. This includes
understanding the sensitivity of borrowers to changes in variables, and how this sensitivity
varies with all other factors. For example, we find that the sensitivity of borrowers to move-
8Other approaches include Poisson regression (Schwartz & Torous (1993)), kernel regression (Maxam &
LaCour-Little (2001)) and radial basis function networks (Episcopos, Pericli & Hu (1998)).
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ments in unemployment rates is not constant as the linear relationship assumed by Campbell
& Dietrich (1983), Cunningham & Capone (1990), Deng (1997) and others would suggest,
but varies significantly with unemployment itself as well as a host of other variables. This
highlights the nonlinear effects pertaining to unemployment. In particular, unemployment
strongly interacts with many other risk factors, not just with loan-to-value ratios and credit
scores in the context of default as suggested by Elul et al. (2010) and Foote et al. (2010),
respectively. Our findings uncover the nature of the relationship between housing finance
markets and the macroeconomy, and how it depends upon borrower and other characteristics.
We analyze the behavior of borrowers at an unprecedented level of granularity. We
distinguish between multiple states, including current, 30 days behind payment, 60 days
behind payment, 90+ days behind payment, foreclosure, REO, and prepaid, and estimate
the full conditional transition probability matrix for these states. The aforementioned papers
only consider transitions from current to prepayment or default, usually meaning a severe
delinquency (such as 60 days or more late). However, this simplified treatment ignores
important transitions between other delinquency states such as 30 days late, 60 days late,
90+ days late, and foreclosure. Our data indicates that transitions between these states
are in fact frequent; see Tables 8–10. For example, a meaningful number of loans enter
foreclosure but eventually return to current. Similarly, many loans are consistently behind
payment but do not ever enter foreclosure. This behavior often matters. For example, during
periods of delinquency Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suffer disruptions to the cashflow from
a loan that need to be considered when analyzing their capital needs (see Frame, Gerardi
& Willen (2015)). Our model enables an econometric treatment of this behavior and our
empirical results offer insights into the factors influencing it.
Several authors have used shallow neural networks in other areas of financial economics.
Bansal & Viswanathan (1993) approximate the pricing kernel using a neural network. Hutchin-
son, Lo & Poggio (1994) pioneered the use of neural networks for nonparametric option
pricing. Brown, Goetzmann & Kumar (1998) use neural networks to predict stock markets.
Swanson & White (1997) propose the use of neural networks for macroeconomic forecasting;
Donaldson & Kamstra (1996) use them for dividend projections, and Elliott & Timmermann
(2008) discuss other applications in economic forecasting. Lee, White & Granger (1993) con-
struct tests for neglected nonlinearities in time series models using neural networks. White
(1989), Granger (1995), and Kuan & White (1994) study nonlinear or neural network mod-
eling of financial time series. Khandani, Kim & Lo (2010) and Butaru, Chen, Clark, Das, Lo
& Siddique (2016) examine other machine learning models of financial default. Recent ap-
plications of deep learning in financial economics include Sirignano (2016), who models limit
order books and Dixon, Klabjan & Bang (2016), who model market movements. Heaton,
Polson & Witte (2016) use deep learning for portfolio selection.
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2 The Data
Our dataset includes data for over 120 million mortgages as well as local and national
economic factors. The mortgage dataset includes highly-detailed characteristics for each
loan and month-by-month loan performance. We complement this dataset with extensive
local economic data such as housing prices, incomes, and unemployment rates.
2.1 Loan Performance and Feature Data
The mortgage data was licensed from CoreLogic, who collects the data from mortgage orig-
inators and servicers. It is the most comprehensive mortgage data set studied to date. It
covers roughly 70% of all mortgages originated in the US and contains mortgages from over
30,000 zip codes across the US. The mortgages’ origination dates range from January 1995 to
June 2014. The dataset includes 25 million subprime and 93 million prime mortgages.9 The
loan data is divided into (1) loan features at origination and (2) performance data, which
we describe below.
Each mortgage has a number of detailed features at origination, such as borrower FICO
score, original loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, original debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, original bal-
ance, original interest rate, product type, type of property, prepayment penalties, zip code,
state, and many more. Many of the variables are categorical with many categories (some
with up to 20 categories). Table 1 provides a complete list of the features we consider.
Only relatively small subsets of these variables have been considered in prior work. Tables
2 through 4 provide summary statistics for FICO score, original LTV ratio, original interest
rate, and original balance. The median FICO score of subprime borrowers is 630, while that
of prime borrowers is 730. The median interest rate of subprime loans is 7.8 percent, while
that for prime loans is 5.8 percent.
Month-by-month performance for each mortgage is reported between 1995 and 2014. This
includes how many days behind payment the mortgage currently is, the current interest rate,
current balance, whether the mortgage is real estate owned (REO), is in foreclosure, or has
paid off. It also includes variables representing borrower behavior over the recent past, such
as the familiar burnout factor and novel factors such as the number of delinquencies (30 days
late, 60 days late) over the past 12 months, which have not been considered before. Table 5
provides the full list of performance features.
9We adopt CoreLogic’s designation of loans as subprime vs. prime. These designations are based on
their categorizations by the originators and servicers who provide the mortgage data to CoreLogic. Loan
characteristics such as FICO score, documentation status, and product features such as negative amortization
are often used in practice to distinguish between subprime and prime loans. Our approach reflects the way
that these loans are viewed by the key economic actors in the mortgage market.
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The dataset covers various mortgage products including, for example, fixed rate mort-
gages, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), hybrid mortgages, and balloon mortgages.10 Table
6 lists the fraction of mortgages in each product category. The vast majority of the prime
mortgages are fixed-rate (86%), followed by ARMs (9%) and hybrids (4%). 48% of the
subprime mortgages are fixed-rate, 29% are ARMs, and 9% are hybrids. Prior work has
typically focused on a particular product such as fixed-rate loans.
Every monthly observation from each of the loans constitutes a data sample. After clean-
ing the data as described in Appendix A, there are roughly 3.5 billion monthly observations
remaining. 90% of the samples are for prime mortgages and the remaining are for subprime.
The samples cover the period January, 1995 to May, 2014. Each sample (i.e., monthly obser-
vation) has 272 explanatory variables as well as the outcome for that month (i.e., if the loan
is current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days delinquent, etc.). Of these explanatory variables, 234
are loan-level feature and performance variables, 25 are indicators for missing features (see
Appendix A), and 13 are economic variables which are introduced next.
2.2 Local and National Economic Factors
We complement the loan-level data described above by data for local and national economic
factors which may influence loan performance. Table 7 lists the factors we consider. We use
a mortgage’s zip code to match a mortgage with local factors such as the monthly housing
price in that zip code. Housing prices are obtained from Zillow and the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). Zillow housing prices are at the five-digit zip code level and cover
roughly 10,000 zip codes. In order to cover less populated areas not covered by the Zillow
dataset, we also include FHA housing prices which cover all three-digit zip codes. The
monthly national mortgage rate is obtained from Freddie Mac, is also included as a factor.11
Unemployment rates at the county level for each year and state unemployment rates for each
month are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.12 Our data also includes the yearly
median income in each zip code, which was acquired from the data provider Powerlytics.
Moreover, we include a dummy variable for the vintage year. Finally, the granular geographic
data is used to construct the lagged default and prepayment rates in each zip code across
the US, using the historical data for all mortgages. The inclusion of these rates allows us
10A fixed rate mortgage has constant interest and principal payments over the lifetime of the mortgage.
An ARM has interest payments which fluctuate with some other index interest rate (such as the Treasury
rate) plus some fixed margin. A hybrid mortgage has a period with a fixed rate followed by a period with
an adjustable rate. Hybrid mortgages can also have other features such as interest rate caps. A balloon
mortgage only partially amortizes; a portion of the loan principal is due at maturity.
11The monthly national mortgage rate used in this paper is an average of 30 year fixed rates for first-lien
prime conventional conforming home purchase mortgages with a loan-to-value of 80 percent.
12We match counties and zip codes in order to associate each mortgage with a particular county.
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to capture a potential contagion effect where defaults of mortgages increase the likelihood
of default for nearby surviving mortgages. Such a feedback mechanism has been supported
by several recent empirical papers; see Agarwal, Ambrose & Yildirim (2015), Anenberg &
Kung (2014), Campbell et al. (2011), Harding, Rosenblatt & Yao (2009), Lin, Rosenblatt &
Yao (2009), Towe & Lawley (2013), and others.
2.3 Mortgage States and Transitions
Mortgages are allowed to transition between 7 states: current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days
delinquent, 90+ days delinquent, foreclosed, REO, and paid off. X days delinquent simply
means the mortgage borrower is X days behind on their payments to the lender. We use
the standard established by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America for determining
the state of delinquency. A mortgage is determined to be 1 month delinquent if no payment
has been made by the last day of the month and the payment was due on the first day of
the month. REO stands for real estate owned property. When a foreclosed mortgage does
not sell at auction, the lender or servicer will assume ownership of the property. Paid off
can occur from a mortgage prepaying, maturing (this is very rare since the mortgages in the
dataset are almost entirely originated in the 2000s), a shortsale, or a foreclosed mortgage
being sold at auction to a third party (this is again rare in comparison to prepayments,
which form the bulk of the paid off events in the dataset).13
The state transition matrix for the monthly transitions between states are given in Tables
8, 9, and 10 for subprime, prime, and all mortgages, respectively. The state transition matrix
records the empirical frequency of the different types of transitions between states. For the
calculation of these transition matrices and the remainder of the paper, REO and paid off
are treated as absorbing states.14 That is, we stop tracking the mortgage after the first
time it enters REO or paid off. The transition matrices highlight that mortgages frequently
transition back and forth between current and various delinquency states. Disruptions in
cashflow to the lender or servicer are common due to the mortgage being behind payment.
Similarly, even loans that are extremely delinquent may return to current; the transition
from foreclosed back to current is actually a relatively frequent occurrence.15 A foreclosure
could get cured via paying the outstanding balance, there could be a pre-auction sale that
covers all or some of the amount outstanding, or there could be a sale at the foreclosure
13A foreclosed loan sold at auction may or may not be sold for a loss. The CoreLogic dataset makes no
distinction between the two events.
14In some states in the USA there are laws that allow the mortgage borrower to reclaim their mortgage
even after it has entered REO. However, such events are exceedingly rare.
15Many servicers follow a “dual path servicing approach” where they foreclose on the borrower as a threat
in order to force the borrower to become current on payments.
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auction that covers all or some of the amount outstanding. Any of these will register as a
foreclosure to paid off transition. Mortgages can also transition directly from current, 30
days delinquent, 60 days delinquent, or 90+ days delinquent to REO via a “deed in lieu of
foreclosure”.16
2.4 Nonlinear Effects
The relationships between state transition rates and explanatory variables (i.e., loan-level
features and economic factors) are often highly nonlinear. For instance, Figure 1 shows the
empirical monthly prepayment rate versus the “incentive to prepay”, initial interest rate
minus national mortgage rate.17 A higher interest rate on the loan (as compared to the
national mortgage rate) should encourage the borrower to seek better terms by refinancing
the loan, implying that an upward trend should be observed in the graph. The observed
data, however, point to more complicated underlying mechanisms, such as the presence of
prepayment penalties or the lack of refinancing options due to other factors such as low FICO
scores. For example, a low initial interest rate may have been facilitated by prepayment
penalties or points upfront, which will be disincentives to prepaying. Figure 4 shows the
empirical monthly prepayment rate versus the FICO score. The propensity to prepay is less
for borrowers with lower FICO scores but it plateaus once the score crosses a threshold of
about 500 points. Figure 5 shows the empirical monthly prepayment rate versus the time
since origination. Several spikes in the rate occur at 1, 2, and 3 years. These might be due
to the expiration of prepayment penalties or adjustable rate and hybrid mortgages having
rate resets. Many of the subprime mortgages started with low teaser rates and would later
jump to higher rates; borrowers would refinance to avoid these rate jumps. Figure 6 plots
the empirical monthly prepayment rate versus the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. One should
expect this curve to have a downward slope since a loan with high LTV will have lesser
opportunities to refinance due to a large loan amount relative to the value of the asset.
Each of these charts displays significant nonlinear relationships between the variable and the
empirical prepayment rate. This reinforces the need for a loan performance model that is
capable of addressing such relationships.
16A “deed in lieu of foreclosure” is when the loan is in default and the borrower gives ownership of the
property directly to the lender, thereby forgoing foreclosure.
17A more accurate proxy for the incentive to prepay would be the current interest rate minus the mortgage
rate. However, a large portion of the mortgages in the dataset are missing the current interest rate so the
initial interest rate was used instead to achieve greater coverage.
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3 Deep Learning Model
We propose a dynamic nonlinear model for the performance of a pool of mortgage loans
over time. We adopt a discrete-time formulation for periods 0, 1, . . . , T (e.g., months).18 We
enumerate the possible mortgage states (current, 30 days delinquent, etc.), and let U ⊂ N
denote the set of these states. The variable Unt ∈ U prescribes the state of the n-th mortgage
at time t after origination. A mortgage will transition between the various states over its
lifetime. For instance, a trajectory of the state process might be:
Un0 = 1 (current), U
n
1 = 2 (30 days late), U
n
2 = 1 (current), U
n
3 = 5 (paid off).
We allow the dynamics of the state process to be influenced by a vector of explanatory
variables Xnt ∈ RdX which includes the mortgage state Unt . In our empirical implementation,
Xnt represents the original and contemporary loan-level features in Tables 1 and 5, and the
contemporary local and national economic factors in Table 7.19 We specify a probability
transition function hθ : U × RdX → [0, 1] satisfying
P[Unt = u | Ft−1] = hθ(u,Xnt−1), u ∈ U , (1)
where θ is a parameter to be estimated. Equation (1) gives the marginal conditional prob-
ability for the transition of the n-th mortgage from its state Unt−1 at time t − 1 to state
u at time t given the explanatory variables Xnt−1. The family of conditional probabilities
give a conditional transition probability matrix, which is the conditional counterpart of the
empirical transition matrix reported in Table 10. Note that the conditional probabilities will
be correlated across loans if Xnt−1 includes variables that are common to several loans. This
formulation allows us to capture loan-to-loan correlation due to geographic proximity and
common economic factors.
We propose to model the transition function hθ by a neural network. Let g denote the
standard softmax function:
g(z) =
(
ez1∑K
k=1 e
zk
, . . . ,
ezK∑K
k=1 e
zk
)
, z = (z1, . . . , zK) ∈ RK , (2)
where K = |U|.20 The vector output of the function g is a probability distribution on U .
18We fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and an information filtration (Ft)t=0,1,...,T .
19As usual, categorial variables are encoded in terms of indicator functions (dummy variables).
20Certain transitions are not allowed in the dataset (e.g., current to 60 days delinquent). Although such
a transition is theoretically allowed in the formulation (2), the transition probabilities of transitions which
do not occur in the dataset will be driven to zero during training.
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The specification hθ(u, x) = (g(Wx+ b))u, where W ∈ RK × RdX , b ∈ RK , and Vu is the
u-th element of the vector V , gives a logistic regression model.21 Here, the link function
g takes a linear function of the covariates x as its input. The output hθ(u, x) varies only
in the constant direction given by W . A standard approach to achieve a more complex
model with greater flexibility is to replace x in the specification with a nonlinear function
of x. Let φ : RdX → Rdφ and set hθ(u, x) = (g(Wφ(x) + b))u, where W ∈ RK × Rdφ and
b ∈ Rdφ . This is a logistic regression of the basis functions φ = (φ1, . . . , φdφ). For instance,
polynomials, step functions, or splines could be chosen as the basis functions. It is important
to recognize that, even if the basis functions are nonlinear in the input space, the logistic
regression model remains a link function of a model which is linear in the parameters θ. The
logistic model may perform poorly if the chosen basis functions are not appropriate for the
problem. Instead of fixing a set of basis functions φ ahead of time, a neural network learns
these feature functions directly from the data. The function φ is replaced by a parameterized
function φθ where θ is estimated from data. A neural network is composed of a sequence of
nonlinear operations (or “layers”). Each operation takes the output from the previous layer
and applies (1) a linear function and then (2) an element-wise nonlinearity. As a whole, a
neural network is a flexible function, highly nonlinear in the parameters, which can learn the
best feature functions φθ for the problem.
Define the nonlinear transformation φθ(x) as hθ,L−1(x). A multi-layer neural network
repeatedly passes linear combinations of learned basis functions through simple nonlinear
link functions to produce a highly nonlinear function. Formally, the output hθ,l : RdX → Rdl
of the l-th layer of the neural network is:
hθ,l(x) = gl(W
>
l hθ,l−1(x) + bl), (3)
where Wl ∈ Rdl × Rdl−1 , bl ∈ Rdl , and hθ,0(x) = x. For l = 1, . . . , L − 1, the nonlinear
transformation gl(z) = (σ(z1), . . . , σ(zdl)) for z = (z1, . . . , zdl) ∈ Rdl and gL(z) is given by
the softmax function g(z) defined in (2). Note that dL = K = |U|. The function σ : R→ R
is a simple nonlinear link function; typical choices are sigmoidal functions, tanh, and rectified
linear units (i.e., max(x, 0)). The final output of the neural network is given by:
hθ(u, x) = (hθ,L(x))u = (g(W
>
L hθ,L−1(x) + bL))u. (4)
The parameter specifying the neural network is
θ = (W1, . . . ,WL, b1, . . . , bL), (5)
21Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham & Hendershott (1986), Elul et al. (2010), Agarwal et al.
(2011), and many others use logistic regression models to analyze mortgage performance.
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where L is the number of layers in the neural network. At each layer l, the output hθ,l(x) is
a simple nonlinear link function gl of a linear combination of the nonlinear basis functions
hθ,l−1(x), where the nonlinear basis function hθ,l−1(x) must be learned from data via the
parameter θ. The output hθ,l(x) from the l-th layer of the neural network becomes the basis
function for the (l + 1)-th layer.
The layers between the input at layer l = 0 and the output at layer l = L are referred
to as the hidden layers. Thus, the neural network hθ has L − 1 hidden layers. A neural
network with zero hidden layers (L = 1) is a logistic regression model. More hidden layers
allow for the neural network to fit more complex patterns. Each subsequent layer extracts
increasingly nonlinear features from the data. Early layers pick up simpler features while
later layers will build upon these simple features to produce more complex features. The
l-th layer has dl outputs where each output is an affine transformation of the output of layer
l − 1 followed by an application of the nonlinear function σ. This composition of functions
is called a hidden unit, or simply, a unit, since it is the fundamental building block of neural
networks. The number of units in the l-th layer is dl and the complexity of any layer (and the
complexity of the features it can extract) increases with the number of units in that layer.
Thus, increased complexity can be achieved by increasing either the number of units or the
number of layers. Given enough units, a neural network can approximate arbitrarily well
continuous functions on compact sets (Hornik 1991). This of course includes approximating
arbitrarily well interactions such as the product and division of features. The advantage of
more layers (as opposed to simply adding more units to existing layers) is that the later
layers learn features of greater complexity by utilizing features of the lower layers as their
inputs. Moreover, deep neural networks, i.e., networks with three or more hidden layers,
typically need exponentially fewer units than shallow networks or logistic regressions with
basis functions; see Bengio & LeCun (2007) and Montufar et al. (2014).22
(1) is a dynamic model and therefore gives transition probabilities between the states
over multiple periods (2 month, 6 month, 1 year, etc.). The transition probability matrix for
1-month ahead transitions is specified by the transition function in (1). The transition prob-
ability matrix for t-months ahead is simply the expectation of the product of the transition
probability matrices at months 0, 1, . . . , t− 1. Note that the transition probability matrices
at months t = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1 are random due to their dependence on the random covariates
Xnt . To compute these expectations, a time-series model for X
n
t needs to be formulated
and Monte Carlo samples from Xnt need to be generated. An alternate approach, which is
advantageous for reducing the computational burden and can be accurate for shorter time
horizons, is that the economic covariates in Xnt are frozen at t = 0. That is, only the state
22The number of layers and the number of neurons in each layer, along with other hyperparameters of the
model, are chosen by the standard approach of cross-validation. Section C provides the details.
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of the mortgage and deterministic elements of Xnt (e.g., the balance of a fixed rate mortgage
and time to maturity) are allowed to evolve over time. Then, the transition probability
matrix for a horizon t > 1 is the product of the deterministic transition probability matrices
at months 0, 1, . . . , t− 1. The two approaches are implemented in Section 5.23
Our formulation captures loan-to-loan correlation due to geographic proximity and com-
mon economic factors. Pool-level quantities, such as the distribution of the prepayment rate
for a given pool, can also be computed via standard Monte Carlo simulation. The cashflow
from a pool is the sum of the cashflows from the individual loans. Thus, one simply needs
to simulate all of the individual loans based on the fitted model and then aggregate the
individual cashflows.24 If the economic covariates are frozen at time t = 0, the pool-level
distribution can be approximated in closed-form via a Poisson approximation or the central
limit theorem. Such approximations are accurate (for the distribution where covariates are
frozen) even for pools with only a few hundred loans.
We have considered alternative model architectures. For instance, one could individually
model transitions from each particular initial state with a neural network; such an approach
would require fitting K different neural networks. Another approach would be to have
separate models for each product (fixed-rate vs. ARM, etc.) or borrower class (prime
vs. subprime). Clearly, our neural network architecture is more parsimonious, which is a
desirable characteristic. However, in addition to parsimony, there is a statistical motive for
our architecture. Neural networks learn via their hidden layers recognizing, and abstracting,
nonlinear features from the data (i.e., nonlinear functions of the initial input). Different
transitions may strongly depend upon the same nonlinear features. Similarly, different types
of products are likely to depend on some of the same nonlinear features. For instance, it is
likely that there are many similar factors driving the transitions current → paid off and 30
days delinquent → paid off. In our neural network architecture, all transitions are modeled
by the same neural network, which has the advantage that more data can be used to better
estimate the nonlinear factors which drive multiple types of transitions.
4 Likelihood Estimation
This section discusses the estimation of the parameter (5) specifying the deep learning model
by the method of maximum likelihood. We are given observations of Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t )
23An alternative approach to the dynamic model (1) is to fit a model for each different time horizon, as
in Campbell et al. (2008). Many static models could be fitted for each of the time horizons (1 month, 2
months, 6 months, 1 year, 1.5 years, 2 years, etc.). Fitting so many models is computationally expensive
and the two approaches mentioned above do not incur this cost.
24Large portfolios can be rapidly simulated using methods from Sirignano & Giesecke (2015). Fast optimal
selection of loan portfolios can be performed using methods from Sirignano, Tsoukalas & Giesecke (2016).
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at each time t = 0, . . . , T where N is the number of mortgages which are observed. We let
Xnt = (U
n
t , L
N
t , V
n
t ), where U
n
t ∈ U is the state of the n-th mortgage, and Lnt includes the
lagged default and prepayment rates in the zip code of the n-th mortgage.25 The vector
V nt ∈ RdY includes the remaining contemporary local and national economic factors in Table
7, as well as the original and contemporary loan-level features in Tables 1 and 5. We make the
standard assumption26 that the variables V nt are exogenous in the sense that the law of V =
(V0, . . . , VT ), where Vt = (V
1
t , . . . , V
N
t ) does not depend on the parameter θ specifying the
law of the observed mortgage states U = (U0, . . . , UT ), where Ut = (U
1
t , . . . , U
N
t ). Therefore,
the likelihood problem for V can be treated separately from that for U .
Although the model framework (1) is a dynamic model where the function hθ may assume
a very complicated form, the likelihood of the observed states U takes an analytical form.
The likelihood of U depends only on the observed value of V and is independent of V ’s
exact form or parameterization since V is exogenous. Letting L = (L0, . . . , LT ) and writing
informally, the log-likelihood function for θ given V is
LT,N(θ) = logPθ
[
U,L|V ] = logPθ[L|U, V ]Pθ[U |V ] = logPθ[U |V ],
where we use the fact that Pθ
[
L|U, V ] = 1 since Lt = (L1t , . . . , LNt ) is a deterministic function
of U0, . . . , Ut. Under the standard assumption that the variables U
1
t , . . . , U
N
t are conditionally
independent given Xt−1, we have27
LT,N(θ) =
T∑
t=1
logPθ
[
Ut
∣∣Ut−1, Vt−1] = T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
logPθ
[
Unt
∣∣Unt−1, V nt−1]
=
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
log hθ(U
n
t , X
n
t−1).
A maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) θˆ = θT,N for the parameter θ satisfies
θT,N ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
LT,N(θ). (6)
The asymptotic properties of the MLEs have been studied before. Under certain conditions,
the estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal; see White (1989a) and White
(1989b). Sussmann (1992) and Albertini & Sontag (1993) study identifiability.
Neural networks tend to be low-bias, high-variance models. We use several methods to
25In general, Lnt could include any variables describing the aggregate lagged performance of the mortgages.
26See Duffie et al. (2007), Campbell et al. (2008), and many others.
27This expression assumes that every mortgage is originated at time t = 0. The modification for the case
where mortgages have different origination dates is straightforward.
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address overfitting, including regularization, dropout, and ensemble modeling. A standard
`2 regularization term is included in the objective function in addition to the log-likelihood
LT,N(θ). The `2 term represents the sum of the squares of the parameters. Secondly, we use
dropout in each of the layers. Dropout is a widely-used technique in deep learning that has
proven to be very successful; see Srivastava, Hinton, Krizhevsky & Sutskever (2014). Dur-
ing fitting, hidden units are randomly removed from the network. This prevents complex
“fictitious” relationships forming between different neurons since neuron i cannot depend
upon neuron j being present. Finally, we also build an ensemble of neural networks. This
simply means that we fit a set of randomly initialized neural networks on datasets obtained
by bootstrapping from the original datasets. Typically, each neural network reaches a dif-
ferent local minimum due to each being trained with a different random initial starts and
random sequence of bootstrapped samples. Variance (i.e., overfitting) of an individual neural
network’s prediction can be reduced by taking the prediction as the average of the neural
networks’ predictions. The averaged prediction, or ensemble prediction, has lower variance
since the idiosyncratic variance for each neural network is averaged out.
Appendix B discusses the implementation of the MLE. We develop fitting algorithms
that can deal very efficiently with the large number of samples and explanatory variables we
observe. The algorithms harness recent advances in GPU parallel computing and run on a
cluster of Amazon Web Services nodes.
Appendix C details our cross-validation approach to the selection of the hyperparameters,
which include the number of layers and number of neurons per layer, the type of the activation
function σ, the size of the regularization penalty, and several other parameters governing the
fitting algorithm (see Appendix B). The optimal network architecture has five hidden layers,
with 200 units in the first hidden layer and 140 units in each subsequent one. The rectified
linear unit activation function σ(x) = max(0, x) was found to yield better performance and
faster convergence than the sigmoid σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x).
The training set includes all the data before May 1, 2012. The validation set, which is
used for the selection of hyperparameters (see Appendix C), is May 1, 2012 until October
31, 2012. Once the hyperparameters are chosen, the model is re-fitted on the combined
training and validation sets. The final trained model is then tested out-of-sample on the
test set, which is from November 1, 2012 until May 31, 2014. All explanatory variables are
normalized by their means and standard deviations (which are calculated using data only
from the training set).
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5 Empirical Results
The fitted deep learning model is used to understand the relationship between explanatory
factors and borrower behavior. Our analysis shows that many highly nonlinear relationships
exist. Furthermore, borrower behavior is found to have nontrivial dependencies on the
nonlinear interaction between multiple factors.
5.1 Explanatory Power of Variables
We begin by studying the explanatory power of the different factors for the behavior of
borrowers. To this end we consider the behavior of the out-of-sample negative average log-
likelihood with respect to changes to the composition of the set of factors. The negative
average log-likelihood 1
N
LT,N(θˆ) is a standard measure of fit, which is sometimes called the
cross-entropy error or simply the loss. We measure by how much the loss increases when a
variable is removed as an explanatory variable. Variables that have large explanatory power,
and whose information is not also largely contained in the other remaining covariates, will
produce large increases in the loss if they are removed.
Table 11 reports the results.28 The state unemployment rate is the variable with by far
the highest explanatory power among all variables, emphasizing the importance of local eco-
nomic conditions for borrower behavior. Standard loan-level variables such as credit score
and loan-to-value ratio, which were highlighted by Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Cunningham
& Capone (1990), Curley & Guttentag (1974), and others as major predictors of borrower
behavior, have less explanatory power. This finding suggests a much tighter connection
between housing finance markets and the macroeconomy than previously thought. Earlier
studies have assigned a relatively limited role to unemployment, see Campbell & Dietrich
(1983), Cunningham & Capone (1990), Deng (1997), Elul et al. (2010), Foote et al. (2010)
and others. Relative to our analysis, these earlier studies are based on much shorter sam-
ple periods, selected loan products (such as 30 year fixed-rate loans) and borrower profiles
(such as prime borrowers), and much smaller samples. Thus, these earlier findings are not
necessarily inconsistent with ours. However, our results provide a more definitive picture
regarding the role of unemployment than prior results because our results are based on an
unprecedented sample that spans several economic cycles over two decades.
The dominant role of unemployment suggests that the loan-to-loan correlation due to
the exposure of borrowers to economic cycles can be substantial. This source of loan-to-loan
correlation is distinct from the foreclosure contagion channel studied by Anenberg & Kung
28For clarity, we exclude from Table 11 the variable representing the current state as well as the dummies
representing missing values (see Appendix A).
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(2014), Campbell et al. (2011), Towe & Lawley (2013), and others.29 Contagion entails
a foreclosure having negative spillover effects on neighboring properties that increase the
likelihood of additional foreclosures. We control for the contagion channel by including the
lagged default rate for prime and subprime borrowers at the zip-code level as explanatory
variables (see Section 2.2). The results in Table 11 suggest that these variables have some
explanatory power, which is consistent with the existence of a contagion channel. The
fact that unemployment plays a critical role even after controlling for the contagion channel
provides evidence for the prevalence of additional loan-to-loan correlation due to the exposure
of borrowers to the local economy. This, in turn, emphasizes the need for mortgage-backed
security investors to diversify loan risk geographically, beyond the conventional borrower
characteristics highlighted in the literature.
5.2 Economic Significance of Variables
We now turn to analyzing the economic significance of the different explanatory factors for
borrower behavior. The economic significance of a particular variable is measured by the
magnitude of the derivative of a fitted transition probability with respect to the variable
(averaged over the data). The derivative is over a representative sample drawn from the
dataset rather than a single point. Specifically, we calculate the sensitivity (with respect to
j-th variable) of the fitted probability for a transition from state u to v as:
E
[∣∣ ∂
∂xj
hθˆ(V,X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣V = v, U = u]. (7)
A sensitivity of value z for a given variable means that the probability for a transition from
state u to v will approximately change (in magnitude) by z∆ if that variable is changed by a
small amount ∆. As explained in Appendix D, the sensitivity (7) can be estimated directly
from the dataset and the fitted model.
In our model formulation, the sensitivity is governed by multiple model parameters that
represent the nonlinear connections between a variable and a transition probability. It is
instructive to contrast that with the linear formulations widely used in earlier studies of
borrower behavior (see the references in Section 1.1). In the case of a linear model, a single
coefficient governs the sensitivity. When nonlinear relations are present, as in our data
(see Section 5.3 below), these coefficients/sensitivities can severely misrepresent the true
economic significance of variables.30
29See Azizpour, Giesecke & Schwenkler (2017) for a discussion of the sources of loan-to-loan correlation.
30To see this, consider the linear regression f(x;α, β) = α+ βx fitted to data produced from the function
y = x2 on x ∈ [−1, 1]. The least-squares estimators are αˆ = 13 and βˆ = 0. This suggests that there is no
relationship between y and the covariate x. However, clearly there is a very strong relationship, which would
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Table 12 reports sensitivities for a transition from current to paid off (i.e., prepayment).
The sensitivities indicate the strong economic significance for prepayment of original and
current outstanding loan balance.31 Other economically significant variables include origi-
nal interest rate, interest rate differentials, house price appreciation, loan age, FICO score,
lagged prepayment rates, and state unemployment.32 The importance of loan balance vari-
ables is interesting in light of earlier studies of prepayment such as Green & Shoven (1986),
Cunningham & Capone (1990) and Richard & Roll (1989). These studies focus on the influ-
ence of interest rate differentials, premium burnout, loan age, LTV ratio and several other
variables, all of which are included in our analysis. Our results indicate that loan balance
variables in fact overshadow all those previously considered variables in terms of economic
significance. Our results also firmly establish the economic significance of unemployment, a
variable which earlier studies such as Cunningham & Capone (1990) and Foote et al. (2010)
found to have no significant influence on prepayment.33
Table 13 reports sensitivities for a transition from current to 30 days delinquent.34 What
stands out is the significant role of variables that describe borrower behavior over the recent
past. These variables include the number of delinquencies (30, 60, and 90+ days late) over
the past year as well as the number of times current over the past year. The number of times
the borrower was 30 days delinquent in the last year dominates all other variables in terms
of economic significance for a transition from current to 30 days delinquent. The strong
influence of these variables indicates that borrower behavior is strongly path dependent.
Prior work on mortgage default risk such as von Furstenberg (1969), Gau (1978), Vandell
(1978), Webb (1982), Campbell & Dietrich (1983), Elul et al. (2010), Foote et al. (2010)
has not analyzed the influence of path-dependent borrower behavior variables, and instead
focused on the role of standard loan and borrower characteristics such as FICO score, interest
rates, and LTV ratios. Our results suggest that these standard variables are less influential
predictors of mortgage delinquency than previously thought.
have been identified if a nonlinear model (such as a neural network) was used.
31We compare the sensitivities implied by the linear logistic regression model (i.e., a 0-layer network)
with those in Table 12 (the values are available upon request). The logistic regression model significantly
understates the sensitivity and hence economic importance of original and current outstanding loan balance,
and overstates the sensitivity for the interest rate and interest rate differentials. Our analysis in Section 5.3
below shows that prepayment has a nonlinear relationship with all these variables. A linear model such as
logistic regression can produce inaccurate sensitivities for such nonlinear relationships.
32Unemployment is not the most economically significant variable. However, this is not inconsistent with
our earlier finding that unemployment is the dominant variable in terms of explanatory power. In this section
we are considering a particular transition and the sensitivity of that transition to small changes in a variable
such as unemployment. In Section 5.1 above, we consider the ability of variables to explain the observed
data jointly for all transitions, not just a particular one.
33Note that these earlier studies are based on much smaller samples and shorter sample periods.
34The sensitivities for other transitions are available upon request.
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5.3 Nonlinear Effects
This section studies nonlinear relationships between borrower behavior and variables. In par-
ticular, we examine the “one-dimensional” relationships between borrower behavior and the
most influential real-valued variables that were identified above. The interactions between
multiple variables and borrower behavior will be analyzed in subsequent sections.
5.3.1 Prepayment Behavior
Figures 2 and 7 show the relationship between prepayment and some of the most influen-
tial variables. In each plot, the fitted prepayment probability’s dependence on a particular
variable is examined, keeping all other variables constant. The other covariates are fixed at
their average values in the dataset, thus representing the “average borrower/loan.” Most of
the relationships in Figures 2 and 7 are highly nonlinear. They reveal new and important
patterns in borrower behavior. Having discussed the significant effects associated with un-
employment already in Section 1, below we focus on the relationship between prepayment
and some of the other influential variables identified in Table 12, including loan balance
variables, interest rates and interest rate differentials, and house price appreciation.
The fitted prepayment probability is a decreasing function of the current outstanding
balance, which is the most influential variable for prepayment. Borrowers with relatively low
current balances are quite likely to prepay, with prepayment probabilities topping 60% for
the smallest balances. This could suggest that borrowers prefer closing out their mortgages
towards the end of the lifetime of the loan, when they have the means to do so, rather than
continue making monthly payments until maturity. The prepayment probability decreases
very quickly to about 10% with the current balance increasing to about $8, 000. The like-
lihood of prepayment decreases at a much slower rate for balances increasing beyond that
amount, and is relatively flat for balances larger than $15, 000. This means that borrower
behavior is relatively insensitive to changes in the current outstanding balance for sufficiently
high balances. Borrower behavior changes very significantly once the balance reaches a level
of about $8, 000.
The behavior of the fitted prepayment probability as a function of original loan balance
is markedly different. The prepayment probability is non-monotonic with regards to the
original loan balance, which is the second most influential variable for prepayment. The
probability increases roughly linearly until the original loan balance reaches a level of about
$350, 000. The rate of change then decreases, with the probability peaking at around 5% for
original loan balances around $600, 000. It then levels off and finally decreases for very large
original loan balances. Large loan balances may be harder to refinance, and borrowers with
large balances may not care much about the benefits of a refinancing in light of the effort it
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takes to close the transaction (assuming it is optimal to refinance).
The current interest rate minus the national mortgage rate indicates the incentive of
the mortgage holder to prepay, and is another highly influential variable for prepayment.
The prepayment probability is highly nonlinear as a function of this quantity. For negative
values, the probability is almost 0 as the mortgage holder has no incentive to prepay. Near
to 0%, the probability suddenly jumps to 3%. In the range 2.5−5%, the probability linearly
increases. Then, for values greater than 5%, the probability increases at a much faster rate.
Above the threshold of 5%, the advantage of prepaying may outweigh prepayment penalties
that certain mortgages have.
The fitted prepayment probability is an approximately piece-wise linear function of house
price appreciation in a borrower’s zip-code since origination. After home prices double a
borrower is 50% more likely to prepay. This is consistent with a behavior where borrowers
sell to realize significant price gains and move into more expensive homes. The sensitivity of
borrowers to additional price appreciation is somewhat lower. The likelihood of prepayment
levels off for price appreciation beyond 250%.
5.3.2 Delinquency Behavior
Figures 3 and 8 show the relationship between delinquency and some of the most influential
variables. In each plot, the fitted probability of a transition from current to 30 days delin-
quent is plotted versus a particular variable, keeping all other variables fixed at their average
values in the dataset. The plots reveal that many of the variables have a highly nonlinear
influence on delinquency. They point to several new and interesting patterns in delinquency
behavior. Having discussed the role of house price appreciation already in Section 1 (see
Figure 3 and the attendant discussion), below we focus on the relationship between delin-
quency and some of the other influential variables identified in Table 13, including variables
that describe recent borrower behavior.
The fitted delinquency probability is an increasing function of the number times a bor-
rower was 30 days delinquent during the past year, which is the most influential variable for
delinquency. (The behavior of delinquency with respect to the number of times a borrower
was 60 days delinquent is similar.) Without delinquencies during the past year, the likelihood
of a delinquency is under 0.5%. With a single delinquency, the likelihood increases to about
4%, which represents a very significant percentage increase in borrower credit risk. With two
delinquencies during the past year, the likelihood increases to about 7%, and with three the
likelihood stands at 12%. This behavior indicates the path-dependent nature of mortgage
credit risk. It is consistent with borrowers “getting used” to being behind payment after
falling behind payment for the first time. Delinquency loses its stigma after the borrower
has fallen behind payment for the first time. The path-dependent behavior is also consis-
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tent with the existence of borrowers who have a hard time making their monthly mortgage
payments and who fall behind payment multiple times a year.
The fitted delinquency probability is a decreasing function of the original loan balance.
For a $100, 000 loan, the likelihood of a delinquency is around 3.5% while for a $200, 000
loan, the likelihood is 1.5%. For loans of $300, 000 and larger, the likelihood of delinquency
is flat at around 0.1%, consistent with the fact that borrowers for larger loans are typically
better off financially.
5.4 Interactions between Variables
Borrower behavior is a high-dimensional function of the explanatory variables. We wish to
understand how borrower behavior simultaneously depends upon multiple variables, i.e., how
different variables interact to influence a certain state transition. To this end we estimate
cross partial derivatives of the fitted transition probabilities, which measure how the effect
of a shift in one variable depends on the size of the shift in another variable. Specifically,
we measure the economic significance of the interaction between covariates i and j for a
transition from state u to v by the derivative
E
[∣∣ 2∑
i,j=1
∂2
∂xi∂xj
hθˆ(V,X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣V = v, U = u]. (8)
This derivative can be generalized to measure higher-order interactions. Appendix D provides
a finite-difference estimator for (8) and a third-order extension.
5.4.1 Prepayment
Tables 14 and 15 present the most influential pairs of variables and triplets of variables
for prepayment. We see that original interest rate, state unemployment, loan balance vari-
ables, and FICO score, which we have identified above as the most influential variables for
prepayment on a stand-alone basis, also strongly interact.
To develop a detailed understanding of the interactions, in Figure 9 we present contour
plots describing the relationship between prepayment and some of the most influential pairs
of variables, and in Figure 10 we present contour plots describing the relationship between
prepayment and triplets of variables. The contour plots represent the joint effects on pre-
payment of multiple variables. In our nonlinear framework, they replace the analysis of the
coefficients of the dummy variables encoding variable interactions in a linear framework such
as Elul et al. (2010) and Foote et al. (2010). The contour plots uncover, for the first time in
the empirical mortgage literature, the complex interplay of many variables.
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Consider the interaction between current outstanding balance and original loan balance,
which are the two economically most significant variables for prepayment. For any given
value of the original loan balance, the likelihood of prepayment is a decreasing function of
the current outstanding balance. However, the behavior strongly depends upon the original
loan balance. The higher the original loan balance, the larger the likelihood of prepayment,
for any given value of the current outstanding balance. Borrowers who took out relatively
large loans and whose current outstanding balance is relatively small are the most likely to
prepay. Those borrowers tend to be more creditworthy, and therefore can more easily obtain
refinancing for relatively small current outstanding loan balances (they have already paid
down a substantial portion of the loan).
Figure 9 also shows the relationship between current outstanding balance and the pre-
payment incentive, as measured by the current interest rate minus national mortgage rate.
For any given value of the incentive, prepayment becomes more likely as the current out-
standing balance decreases. For any given value of the current outstanding balance, as the
prepayment incentive increases, prepayment becomes more likely. For very large outstanding
balances, even if the prepayment incentive is large, borrowers do not prepay. This obser-
vation is consistent with the fact that larger loans are typically more difficult to refinance.
For negative prepayment incentives, even if the outstanding balance is very small, borrowers
also do not prepay. While borrowers with low current balances might want to close out their
mortgage as argued in Section 5.3.1 above, even if they do have the required liquidity they
might recognize the disincentive to prepay. Borrowers with small outstanding balances and
high prepayment incentives are the most likely to prepay.
The relationship between original term of the loan and the number of times that a
borrower was current during the last year is also shown in Figure 9. The prepayment
probability is an increasing function of the number of times current, for any loan term.
Borrowers with 30 year loans which were current during each of the past 12 months are the
most likely to prepay. Borrowers with 30 year loans which were not current at all during the
12 months are the least likely to prepay.
Three-dimensional interactions can be analyzed via the stacked contour plots in Figures
10. For example, consider Figure 11, which focuses on one of the panels in Figure 10. Fig-
ure 11 displays the three-dimensional interaction between the original interest rate, original
interest rate - national mortgage rate, and state unemployment rate. In favorable economic
scenarios when the unemployment rate is low (the bottom contour plot in the stack), pre-
payment probabilities strongly depend upon the original interest and the original interest -
national mortgage rate. Under adverse economic conditions, when the unemployment rate
is high (the top contour plot in the stack), the prepayment probability is very low and is in
fact insensitive to the original interest rate and original interest - national mortgage rate.
27
That is, very few borrowers will prepay no matter how great the financial incentive there is
for prepaying.
5.4.2 Delinquency
Tables 16 and 17 present the most influential pairs of variables and triplets of variables for
30-day delinquency. We find that original interest rate, interest rate differentials, original
loan term, FICO score, loan balance variables, and past delinquency behavior, which we have
identified above as influential variables for delinquency on a stand-alone basis, also strongly
interact.
Figure 12 presents contour plots describing the relationship between delinquency and
different pairs of covariates. The plots offer insights into the joint effects on delinquency be-
havior of multiple influential variables. Consider the relationship between past delinquency
behavior, current outstanding balance, and transitions to delinquency. The probability of a
transition from current to 30 days delinquent increases if the borrower has been delinquent
in the past. For example, if the borrower has been delinquent more than 8 times in the past
12 months, then a transition from current to 30 days delinquent occurs at an almost 20%
monthly rate. The behavior strongly depends upon the current outstanding balance. Specif-
ically, the probability of becoming delinquent increases as the current outstanding balance
increases. A larger outstanding balance places significant financial stress on the borrower.
Borrowers with large outstanding balances and who have frequently been delinquent in the
past are very likely to return to delinquency.
Figure 12 also includes a contour plot describing the relationship between FICO score,
current outstanding balance, and transitions to delinquency. As the FICO score decreases, a
transition to delinquency becomes more likely. As the current outstanding balance increases,
a transition to delinquency also becomes more likely. This is to be expected since borrowers
will find it more difficult to service larger loans. Even borrowers with high FICO scores have
a nontrivial probability of becoming delinquent for very large loans. Borrowers with low
FICO scores and large outstanding balances are very likely to become delinquent. In any
given month, a transition from current to 30 days delinquent occurs at a 10% rate for this
group of borrowers. In contrast, borrowers with high FICO scores and small outstanding
balances almost never become delinquent.
Another of the contour plots in Figure 12 describes interaction of original interest rate
and FICO score. There are several regimes; within each regime, the delinquency behavior is
very different. For very high FICO scores (> 800), borrowers rarely become delinquent no
matter how high the original interest rate is. That is, in the high FICO score regime, the
probability of delinquency is insensitive to the interest rate. For low FICO scores (< 650),
the probability of delinquency strongly depends upon the interest rate. In this regime, the
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likelihood of delinquency increases as the interest rate increases. Notably, there is a nonlinear
relationship within the low FICO score regime. The sensitivity to the interest rate is smaller
in the low interest rate, low FICO score regime than in the high interest rate, low FICO
score regime.
Figure 13 displays the interactions between triplets of variables. Figure 14 focuses on one
of the panels of Figure 13. It displays the relationship between FICO score, original interest
rate, number of times current in last 12 months, and transitions to delinquency. When the
borrower is rarely current, the borrower’s FICO score is low, and the interest rate is high,
then the borrower is highly likely to fall behind payment again (the likelihood exceeds 25%
on a monthly basis). Furthermore, there is a very nonlinear relationship between FICO score
and interest rate, and this relationship strongly depends on the number of times current.
In the high FICO score regime (> 800), the probability of delinquency is insensitive to the
interest rate. For low FICO scores (< 650), the probability of delinquency strongly depends
upon the interest rate. If the loan is more frequently current, the probability of delinquency
decreases, across all FICO scores and original interest rates. Furthermore, the delinquency
probability quickly asymptotes to a small value as the FICO score increases or the original
interest rate decreases.
6 Out-of-Sample Analysis
This section examines the out-of-sample behavior of the deep learning model. The results
illustrate the model’s goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy. They also provide insights
into the nature and significance of the nonlinear effects associated with borrower behavior.
In particular, the results suggest that a prepayment event involves the strongest nonlinear
effects among all events. This is shown to have import implications for mortgage investment
management and the behavior of pool-level mortgage risk.
6.1 Goodness-of-Fit
We begin by considering the goodness-of-fit of the deep learning model. Since model param-
eters were fitted to maximize the log-likelihood, we use the negative average log-likelihood
(loss) as a measure of the overall goodness-of-fit of a model across all possible state transi-
tions. Table 18 reports the in- and out-of-sample loss for neural networks with 0, 1, 3, 5,
and 7 hidden layers, as well as an ensemble model composed of eight 5-layer networks.
The results indicate the behavior of the goodness-of-fit as a function of the depth of the
network. As expected, the more complex the network the better the in-sample fit. However,
deeper networks do not always yield better out-of-sample fit due to higher model capacity;
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there are several other factors at play, such as over-fitting and difficulty in estimating the
model, that affect the out-of-sample performance. We also observe that the use of dropout
significantly improves out-of-sample fit for networks with greater depths. This shows that
dropout provides effective regularization and addresses over-fitting for networks with larger
numbers of layers. The characteristic U-shaped behavior of the out-of-sample loss in Table
18 suggests that the optimal number of hidden layers (in the sense of out-of-sample goodness-
of-fit) is five when using dropout and three when dropout is not applied.35 The goodness-
of-fit optimality of deep networks provides strong evidence for the existence of complex
nonlinearities in the mortgage performance data.
We also observe that the ensemble model, which is composed of eight 5-layer networks,
outperforms all other formulations in terms of fit. Figure 15 shows the out-of-sample loss
versus the number of models in the ensemble. Including just eight networks in the ensem-
ble significantly improves out-of-sample fit, indicating that ensemble modeling effectively
reduces over-fitting. Although larger ensembles lead to marginal improvements in fit, the
computational cost (which increases linearly with the number of neural networks used) may
not justify using larger ensembles in practice. Henceforth, we only consider ensembles of
eight independently fitted networks.
Finally, Table 18 reports test statistics for likelihood ratio tests of 0- vs. 1-layer mod-
els, 1- vs. 3-layer models, 3- vs. 5-layer models, and 5- vs. 7-layer models. All tests are
highly significant (with p-values of less than 0.01). Moreover, the behavior of the test statis-
tic suggests that the most significant improvement of model fit is obtained by permitting
nonlinear relationships between borrower behavior and explanatory variables. Going from a
linear model (0-layer network) to the simplest nonlinear model (1-layer network) generates
the most significant improvement in the test statistic, which provides additional evidence for
the existence of nonlinear relationships in the data.
6.2 Loan-Level Predictive Accuracy
We next consider Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and Area Under Curve
(AUC), which are standard measures of predictive accuracy for a binary classifier. The
binary classifier generates an estimate of the probability that the input sample belongs to
the positive class (e.g., 30 days past due). The ROC curve plots the true positive rate versus
the false positive rate as the discriminative threshold is varied between 0 and 1. The AUC is
the area under the ROC curve and a higher value shows an improved ability of the classifier
to discern between the two classes (the maximum value of the AUC is 1, corresponding to
perfect forecasts). Alternatively, the AUC can be interpreted as the probability that the
35See Goodfellow et al. (2016) for an excellent discussion of the optimal depth and number of hidden units.
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model generates a larger value for a sample randomly chosen from the positive class than
for a sample randomly chosen from the negative class.
We consider the out-of-sample AUC for the ROC curve for the transition of a mortgage
between two states (paid off, current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days delinquent, 90+ days
delinquent, foreclosure, and REO). Specifically, the AUC for transition u → v is the AUC
for the two-way classification of whether the mortgage is in state v or not in state v at a
1-month horizon conditional on the mortgage currently being in state u. Figures 16, 17, 18,
19, and 20 report the AUCs for networks with 0, 1, 3, and 5 hidden layers, and an ensemble
of eight 5-layer networks. They give a complete picture of model performance in different
states and for different types of transitions. They also yield interesting insights into the
behavior of the nonlinear effects associated with transitions.
We see that in general, the greater the depth of the network, the larger are the out-of-
sample AUCs. The improvements in performance are most striking for transitions to paid
off (i.e., prepayments). This suggest that prepayments involve highly nonlinear effects, more
so than other transition events. Table 19 reports the AUCs for prepayment, and Figure 21
provides several of the corresponding ROC curves. The prepayment AUCs of the 1-layer
neural network represent improvements between 3 percent (for transitions from 30 days
delinquent to paid off) and 30 percent (for transitions from 90+ days delinquent to paid
off) over the AUCs of the linear 0-layer network. This suggests that the nonlinear effects
associated with transitions from severe delinquency to prepaid are the strongest among all
transitions to prepaid.
6.3 Mortgage Investment Portfolios
To analyze the implications of nonlinear effects for investment management, we consider the
out-of-sample investment performance of mortgage portfolios constructed using networks of
different depths. Consider an investor who seeks to design a loan portfolio with uninterrupted
cashflow. An example is a financial institution which originates loans and retains some
loans on their balance sheet. Another example is an asset manager who constructs a loan
investment portfolio. Delinquency often produces a loss of cashflow while prepayments lead
to early cashflows that might have to be reinvested at lower interest rates. Uninterrupted
cashflows require loans which are both unlikely to be delinquent and unlikely to prepay. This
is equivalent to designing a portfolio of loans which are highly likely to remain current. Given
an available pool of loans to select a portfolio from, loans can be ranked by a model-implied
likelihood that they remain current. For a portfolio of size N , one then chooses the N loans
with the highest probabilities of remaining current.
The above approach can be used to evaluate the importance for investment management
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of capturing nonlinear effects in mortgage state transitions. We form two portfolios of N
loans from an available pool of 100,000 mortgages (randomly chosen from the test dataset).
The first portfolio is chosen using the nonlinear 5-layer network and the second portfolio
is chosen using the linear 0-layer network. A portfolio is chosen by ranking the available
loans according to their probability of being current as predicted by the model and then
choosing the N loans mostly likely to be current.36 Figure 22 shows how the portfolios
perform out-of-sample over 1 month and 1 year time horizons.37 The portfolio generated
by the nonlinear 5-layer network significantly outperforms the portfolio generated by the
linear 0-layer model in terms of prepayment rates. This finding is consistent with our earlier
finding in Section 6.2 that prepayment events involve strong nonlinear effects, which the
0-layer model fails to capture. Table 20 (Table 21) reports the percent of the two portfolios
with size N = 20, 000 in each state (REO, paid off, etc.) at a 1 month (1 year) time horizon.
At a 1 year horizon, the 5-layer network portfolio has a significantly lower prepayment rate
than the 0-layer network portfolio. This feature of the 5-layer network portfolio directly
translates into improved return for an investor. Conservatively assume that prepayment
results in a loss of 5% of notional, foreclosure and REO produce losses of 40% of notional,
and m months delinquent leads a loss of m
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× 100% of notional. Then, the 5-layer network
portfolio has a 46% smaller loss than the 0-layer network portfolio at a 1 year time horizon.
These results indicate the significant importance for investment management of capturing
nonlinear effects in borrower behavior, especially prepayment.
6.4 Pool-Level Accuracy
We finally evaluate the accuracy of out-of-sample predictions of pool-level risk, which is
especially relevant to mortgage-backed security investors. The expected delinquency rates,
prepayment rate, and return of a mortgage pool is easily calculated by simply summing the
expectations of the individual mortgages. We examine the pool-level predictions of the 5-
layer network for 2,000 pools created from 2 million mortgages in our test dataset. Each pool
contains 1,000 mortgages. Pools are created by rank ordering the loans according to a given
loan characteristic (e.g., the interest rate) and then sequentially placing the loans in pools
of size 1,000.38 This produces pools with varying levels of risk. Four cases are examined.
We create pools by rank ordering according to FICO score, interest rate, LTV ratio, and the
36The same approach can be used to rank loans according to other criteria. For instance, if one wanted
to account for both the interest rate and the risk of the loan, the expected return for each loan could be
calculated for each model. Then, the loans could be ranked according to their expected returns.
37The 1 year transition probabilities are produced using the method described in Section 3 where the
time-varying covariates (e.g., unemployment rates) are frozen.
38The loans with the top thousand highest interest rates are placed in the first pool, loans with the
1001-2000th highest interest rates are placed in the second pool, etc.
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predicted probability that the loan is current. Figures 23, 24, 25, and 26 show the pool-level
prediction of prepayment for a 1 year time horizon. The 1 year transition probabilities and
the pool-level prediction are produced using the method described in Section 3 where the
time-varying covariates are frozen. The diagonal line represents a perfect prediction. The
prediction generated by the 5-layer model is fairly accurate; for comparison we also show the
prediction produced by the linear 0-layer model.39
Figures 27 and 28 show the pool-level distribution of prepayment for the 5-layer neural
network for several different pools. Each pool has 10,000 mortgages and the time horizon is 1
year. The national mortgage rate was simulated forward and all other time-varying covariates
were frozen. For illustrative purposes, we use a simple AR(4) model that was fitted to
historical data for the national mortgage rate obtained from Freddie Mac.40 This formulation
accounts for correlated prepayment behavior due to the common exposure of borrowers to
future movements of the mortgage rate. Note that the actual observed prepayments in
Figures 27 and 28 falls in the center of the distribution generated by the 5-layer network
while it falls in the tail of the distribution of the linear 0-layer model, which is included here
for comparison. Thus, in these cases, the 5-layer network-produced prepayment distribution
accurately captured the out-of-sample outcome at pool-level.
To obtain a more comprehensive understanding of pool-level accuracy, we consider 50 test
portfolios with 10,000 mortgages each obtained by slicing a pool of 500,000 mortgages. Table
22 reports average statistics (over the 50 test portfolios) for the prepayment distributions
produced by the 5-layer neural network, and gives a sense of the out-of-sample prediction
error. The statistics for 0-layer model are included for comparison. The 5-layer network-
produced distribution tends to have less variance with the mean of the distribution closer
to the observed number of prepayments, thereby predicting pool-level prepayments more
accurately. These pool-level results suggest that nonlinear effects are not only associated
with individual borrower behavior, but also with correlated borrower behavior, especially
correlated prepayment events.
39The 0-layer model’s pool-level predictions in Figures 23, 24, 25, and 26 appear to be systematically
biased upwards (i.e., above the diagonal line). This systematic bias is due to the predictions for all pools
depending upon the same covariates. For instance, if one prediction is biased upwards due to the realized
value of the national mortgage rate, it is likely that all pool predictions will be biased upwards since they
all depend upon the same realization of the national mortgage rate.
40The fitted parameters are [0.6687, 1.3514,−0.5131, 0.2410,−0.0838]. The lag was chosen using the partial
autocorrelation plot. Of course, more complex models could be chosen alternatively.
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the behavior of mortgage borrowers using an unprecedented dataset of
origination and monthly performance records for over 120 million mortgages originated across
the US between 1995 and 2014. The analysis is based on a nonlinear deep learning model of
multi-period borrower state transitions that incorporates the influence on borrower behav-
ior of a large number of loan- and borrower-specific as well as economic and demographic
variables at national, state, county and zip-code levels.
Our empirical findings yield a range of important new insights into the behavior of mort-
gage borrowers. The relationship between borrower behavior and risk factors is found to be
highly nonlinear, which questions many linear models studied in prior work. Interaction ef-
fects, where the impact of a variable depends on the values of other variables, are ubiquitous.
We find evidence suggesting that prepayments are most affected; they involve the strongest
nonlinear effects among all events. The major drivers of prepayment, which include original
and current outstanding loan balances even before standard factors such interest rates and
interest rate spreads, strongly interact. Jumbo loan borrowers whose current outstanding
balance is relatively small are the most likely to prepay.
Our results also highlight the importance of local economic conditions for borrower be-
havior. State unemployment is found to have the greatest explanatory power among all
factors. This indicates a tighter connection of housing finance markets and the macroe-
conomy than previously thought. We find that the sensitivity of a borrower to changes in
unemployment is not constant as often assumed in prior work, but strongly depends upon
current unemployment. The sensitivity also significantly varies across the entire borrower
population, highlighting an interaction effect between unemployment and many standard
borrower characteristics that were previously studied only individually.
Our empirical results have significant implications for mortgage-backed security (MBS)
investors. The dominant role of unemployment highlights the exposure of borrowers to eco-
nomic cycles, which can be a substantial source of loan-to-loan correlation. The prevalence of
this correlation emphasizes the need for MBS investors to diversify mortgage risk geograph-
ically, beyond the conventional borrower characteristics highlighted in the literature. The
nonlinear nature of the influence on borrower behavior of many variables including unem-
ployment has implications for the rating and hedging of MBS. Investors need to account for
the nonlinear effects when constructing hedging positions against macroeconomic volatility.
Rating agencies need to address the nonlinear behavior when assessing the exposure of MBS
investors with respect to adverse macroeconomic conditions.
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A Data Cleaning
A fraction of the mortgages have missing data, including missing data for some of the key
features such as FICO, LTV ratio, original interest rate, and original balance. The missing
data is a result of reporting errors by the originator or servicer, or incomplete information
provided by the borrower at the time of origination. Key features that are missing are more
likely to be the result of reporting errors. For instance, original balance and original interest
rate are required details in any mortgage contract. If they are missing, it must be due to
a reporting error and not the borrower failing to provide this information. Similarly, FICO
score and LTV ratio are almost universally available for mortgage borrowers. Other features,
however, may simply not have been provided by the borrower at the time of origination. An
example is debt-to-income ratio, which is often not available for subprime borrowers. We
take the following approach towards missing data. We insist that any sample must have at
least FICO, LTV ratio, original interest rate, and original balance. Samples missing one of
these variables are removed. Missing data for other features, which are more likely to be due
to incomplete information provided by the borrower, are typically encoded as an additional
indicator variable (1 if it’s missing, 0 if it’s not missing). This standard approach eliminates
the need to remove the corresponding samples, and allows us to measure the implications of
missing features. For a discussion of this approach, see Gelman & Hill (2007, Chapter 25).
There are also certain events reported in the CoreLogic dataset which are errors. For
instance, monthly mortgage transitions from current to 60 days delinquent or from 30 days
delinquent to 90+ days delinquent are not possible. Errors of this type are very infrequent
in the dataset and we remove those samples where such errors occur. Mortgages can also
have their “servicing released” or their state may be reported as “unknown”, “status no
longer provided”, or “invalid data”. “Servicing released” means the servicer which previously
reported the data to CoreLogic for that particular mortgage no longer services that mortgage
and therefore no longer reports data for it. The mortgage state being “unknown”, “status
no longer provided”, or “invalid data” could be due to a range of clerical/software errors.
Whenever a mortgage is in any of these states or has its “servicing released”, we exclude any
subsequent monthly data from our sample.
B Implementation of MLE
There are significant computational hurdles to training models due to the large size of our
dataset as well as due to the size of the deep neural networks. The dataset includes the
individual characteristics of each loan as well as monthly updates on loan performance. We
include 272 features for each mortgage. Since our models are dynamic, there is a sample for
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each month of data. In total, we train over roughly 3.5 billion samples, which is almost 2
terabytes of data, and only a fraction of the dataset can be loaded into (RAM) memory at
any one time. Further, many of the deep neural networks contain tens of thousands of free
parameters. Estimating these parameters in order to fit the model requires computing the
gradients using backpropagation, which is a time and memory intensive procedure. Fitting
just one such model on our data using typical computing resources (e.g., using MATLAB
or R on a desktop with conventional CPU) would require weeks of training time, which
makes fitting and iterating through models impractically slow. In contrast, we train up to
10 models simultaneously in a span of few days. This is made possible by using several tools
that harness both optimized hardware as well as computational tricks, which we describe in
the remainder of the section.
While training, every data sample undergoes the same series of transformations through
the layers of the neural network, which makes the procedure very amenable to paralleliza-
tion. Accelerated training can be achieved by employing Graphics Processing Units (GPU)
which enable performing several thousand simple operations, such as matrix multiplication,
simultaneously. We harness the power of GPUs, which provide more than a 10x speedup over
CPU, to address the problem of a large dataset. Moreover, to iterate faster it is important
to be able to train multiple models simultaneously. Therefore, we set up a cluster computing
environment where each model is trained independently on individual nodes (powered by
GPUs) and all nodes have access to a central data server. This avoids the need for repli-
cating data on individual nodes and enables efficient training. We achieve this practically
by using Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a cloud computing platform that allows
flexible scaling of compute resources. In our implementation, we use up to 10 single-GPU
nodes, where each GPU contains 1,536 CUDA cores and 4 GB of memory. The bandwidth
of the central data server allows up to 15 nodes to fetch data simultaneously to train their
models.
There are several other software optimizations that help make the training faster. We
use a specialized deep learning library Torch, which has been developed by Facebook and
Google and uses the Lua programming language. Such specialized libraries optimize the
commonly used operations for neural networks and have fast routines written in C that
speed up training by an order of magnitude. Further, we use single precision floating point
operations (instead of double precision) throughout our code. This has no practical effect
on the parameter estimates and it halves the memory requirements and leads to substantial
speed up in the computations.
Gradient descent for fitting models is impractical due to the size of the data. We use
the standard machine learning method of minibatch gradient descent with momentum; see
Ngiam, Coates, Lahiri, Prochnow, Le & Ng (2011) for a discussion of minibatch gradient
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descent for deep neural networks. In minibatch gradient descent, gradient steps are sequen-
tially taken using subsets of the dataset. A block of the data is loaded into memory and the
gradient of the objective function is calculated on this block of data. A step is then taken in
the direction of the minibatch gradient with the step size determined by the “learning rate”.
Another block of data is then loaded into memory and the process repeats. The size of this
block of data, referred to as the batch size, and the learning rate are optimized in order for
fast (but stable) convergence of the model parameters.
In order that the minibatch gradients are unbiased, blocks of data must be drawn at
random from the entire dataset. If gradients are biased, training may not converge and
accuracy may be lost. A typical issue with mortgage and other types of loan data is that
it is not stored randomly, but instead split into categories such as geographic region, time
period, and loan type. Due to the size of the data, randomly scrambling the data can
be computationally challenging. The original CoreLogic dataset needs to be reorganized
for model fitting. The original dataset provided by CoreLogic is divided into static data
(origination features) and dynamic data (monthly loan performance). The static data itself
is divided into separate geographic regions (e.g., Pacific, Northeast, Southeast). The dynamic
data is divided into geographic regions and then into months. In order to create a training
sample, one has to match the static data for a loan with all of the monthly updates for that
loan in the dynamic data files. In addition, one has to randomly order the training samples
such that there is no bias towards a particular origination time or geographic location.
Matching static data with the dynamic data via a search through these different subsets is
impractical due to the size of the dataset. In order join the static and dynamic data, we
create a hash table whose keys are the loan IDs and whose values are the destination folders
1, . . . , L (randomly chosen). This hash table is used to randomly distribute the loans to the
folders. Secondly, we use another hash table to match static data with dynamic data with
these destination folders in order to avoid a search.
C Hyperparameter Selection
Neural networks have a number of hyperparameters which need to be chosen. The standard
approach to choosing these hyperparameters is to cross-validate them via a validation set.
We train neural networks with different hyperparameters on the training set and compare
the log-likelihood on the validation set. In particular, we cross-validate the number of layers
and number of neurons per layer. The more layers and more neurons, the more complex
the neural network is and the better able it is to fit complex relationships. However, with
more complexity, there is also a higher chance of overfitting. We also cross-validate the size
of the `2 penalty, the learning rate schedule, batch size (see Appendix B), and the type of
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nonlinearity via a sparse grid search. For each grid point, we train a neural network and
record its validation error. We then choose the hyperparameters at the grid point with the
lowest validation error.
Several learning rate schedules were tested. The learning rate schedule is critical for
training the neural network. If the learning rate is too high, there can be large oscillations
that may drive the estimates away from the optimal value. If the learning rate is too low,
the neural network will learn very slowly. The chosen learning rate schedule is:
Learning rate =
LR0
1 + t/800
, (9)
where the initial learning rate LR0 = 0.1 and t is the epoch number. The half-life (i.e., the
number of epochs until the learning rate is reduced by half) is 800. Each epoch contains
approximately 1.5 million training samples. The batchsize is 4, 000, meaning approximately
375 gradient steps are taken per epoch.
Cross-validation leads to the choice of 5 hidden layers, with 200 units in the first hidden
layer and 140 units in each subsequent one. The rectified linear unit (ReLU) nonlinearity
(i.e., σ(x) = max(0, x)) was found to yield better performance and faster convergence than
the sigmoid nonlinearity (σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x)).
D Finite-Difference Approximation of Sensitivities
This appendix provides finite-difference estimators for the sensitivities considered in in Sec-
tion 5.4. The sensitivity (7) can be estimated directly from the dataset using the formula
Sensitivity(u, v, j) =
1
|Mu|
∑
(n,t)∈Mu
∣∣∣∣∂hθˆ(v, x)∂xj
∣∣∣∣
x=Xnt
(10)
where Mu = {(n, t) : Unt = u, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ n ≤ N}, xj is the j-th element of x, and θˆ is
the MLE. Here Xnt and U
n
t are the vector of explanatory variables and the state of mortgage
n at time t, respectively. Note that the quantity in (10) aggregates over only the relevant
mortgages and times, namely those in Mu. This allows computing the probability that this
mortgage attains state v at time t + 1, which in turn facilitates computing the sensitivity
for transition from state u to v. The formula (10) is the sensitivity across the entire dataset
rather than the sensitivity at a single representative point.
We now develop a finite-difference approximation for the sensitivity (8). Importantly,
the finite-difference formulas can be used to analyze the sensitivity of nonlinear functions
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which are piecewise linear (such as neural networks with ReLU units). Let
Interaction(u, v, i, j) =
1
|Mu|
∑
(n,t)∈Mu
∣∣∣∣(hθˆ(v, ·, xi + ∆i, ·, xj + ∆j, ·)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, ·, xj, ·))
− (hθˆ(v, ·, xi + ∆i, ·, xj, ·)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, ·, xj, ·))
− (hθˆ(v, ·, xi, ·, xj + ∆j, ·)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, ·, xj, ·))∣∣∣∣
x=Xnt
(11)
The formula (11) measures how much of the change in the fitted transition probability hθˆ
cannot be explained by independent shifts xi → xi + ∆i and xj → xj + ∆j. It is a second-
order sensitivity. If hθˆ is smooth and ∆i = ∆j = ∆  1, 2∆2 Interaction(u, v, i, j) is a
finite-difference estimator for
E
[∣∣ 2∑
i,j=1
∂2hθˆ
∂xi∂xj
(V,X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣V = v, U = u] (12)
If there is no interaction (for example, loan performance depends linearly on the covariates),
Interaction(u, v, i, j) of course equals 0.
Similarly, the importance of the interaction between three covariates i, j, k for a transition
from state u to v is measured by:
Interaction(u, v, i, j, k) =
1
|Mu|
∑
(n,t)∈Mu
∣∣∣∣(hθˆ(v, ·, xi + ∆i, xj + ∆j, xk + ∆k)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, xj, xk))
− (hθˆ(v, ·, xi + ∆i, xj + ∆j, xk)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, xj, xk)
− (hθˆ(v, ·, xi + ∆i, xj, xk + ∆k)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, xj, xk)
− (hθˆ(v, ·, xi, xj + ∆j, xk + ∆k)− hθˆ(v, ·, xi, xj, xk))∣∣∣∣
x=Xnt
(13)
The formula (13) measures the third-order interactions. It detects interactions between three
covariates which are not explained by the sum of the pairwise interactions. If hθˆ is smooth
and ∆i = ∆j = ∆ 1, 6∆3 Interaction(u, v, i, j, k) is a finite-difference estimator for
E
[∣∣ ∑
α+β+ζ=3
∂3hθˆ
∂xαi ∂x
β
j ∂x
ζ
k
(V,X)
∣∣∣∣∣∣V = v, U = u]. (14)
If there are only pairwise interactions (for example, loan performance depends quadratically
on the covariates), Interaction(u, v, i, j, k) of course equals 0. If Interaction(u, v, i, j, k) 6= 0, it
indicates that there is significant nonlinearity beyond even a quadratic model. More impor-
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tantly, it indicates which triplets of covariates are interacting most strongly with each other.
The formula (13) can be generalized to measure even higher order interactions (fourth, fifth,
etc.); however, this paper only empirically investigates second- and third-order interactions.
40
Feature Values
FICO score Continuous
Original debt-to-income ratio Continuous
Original loan-to-value ratio Continuous
Original interest rate Continuous
Original balance Continuous
Original term of loan Continuous
Original sale price Continuous
Buydown flag True, False
Negative amortization flag True, False
Occupancy Type Owner occupied, second home, non-owner occupied or investment prop-
erty, other
Prepayment penalty flag True, False
Product type See Table 6
Loan purpose Purchase, Refinance Cash-out, Refinance No Cash Out, Second mort-
gage, Refinance Cash Out Unkown, Construction Loan, Debt Consoli-
dation Loan, Home Improvement Loan, Education Loan, Medical Loan,
Vehicle Purchase, Reverse Mortgage, Other
Documentation Full documentation, Low or minimal documentation, No asset or income
verification, Other
Lien type 1st Position, 2nd Position, 3rd Position, 4th Position, Other
Channel Retail Branch, Wholesale Bulk, Mortgage Broker, Realtor Originated,
Relocation Corporate, Relocation Mortgage Broker, Builder, Direct
Mail, Other Direct, Internet, Other Retail, Mortgage Banker, Corre-
spondent, Other
Loan type Conventional Loan, VA Loan, FHA Loan, Other Government Loan, Af-
fordable Housing Loan, Pledged Asset Loan, Other
Number of units 1,2,3,4,5
Appraised value < sale price? True, False
Initial Investor Code Portfolio Held, Securitized Other, GNMA/Ginnie Mae, GSE
Interest Only Flag True, False
Margin for ARM mortgages Continuous
Periodic rate cap Continuous
Periodic rate floor Continuous
Periodic pay cap Continuous
Periodic pay floor Continuous
Lifetime rate cap Continuous
Lifetime rate floor Continuous
Rate reset frequency 1,2,3, . . . (months)
Pay reset frequency 1,2,3, . . . (months)
First rate reset period 1,2,3, . . . (months since origination)
Convertible flag True, False
Pool insurance flag True, False
Alt-A flag True, False
Prime flag True, False
Subprime flag True, False
Geographic state CA, FL, NY, MA, etc.
Vintage (origination year) 1995, 1996, . . . , 2014
Table 1: Loan-level features at origination (from CoreLogic).
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Feature Mean Median Min Max 25% Quantile 75% Quantile
FICO 634 630 300 900 580 680
Original LTV 74 80 0 200 68 90
Original interest rate 7.8 7.8 0 30 6.3 9.6
Original balance 160,197 124,000 7 318,750 68,850 210,000
Table 2: Summary statistics for some mortgage features in subprime data.
Feature Mean Median Min Max 25% Quantile 75% Quantile
FICO 720 730 300 900 679 772
Original LTV 74 79 0 200 63 90
Original interest rate 5.8 5.8 0 20.6 4.9 6.6
Original balance 190,614 151,353 1 6,450,000 98,679 238,000
Table 3: Summary statistics for some mortgage features in prime data.
Feature Mean Median Min Max 25% Quantile 75% Quantile
FICO 707 718 300 900 660 767
Original LTV 74 79 0 200 63 90
Original interest rate 6 5.95 0 30 4.9 6.9
Original balance 186,202 148,500 1 6,450,000 94,000 234,000
Table 4: Summary statistics for some mortgage features in full dataset (prime and subprime).
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Feature Values
Current status Current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days
delinquent, 90+ days delinquent, Fore-
closed, REO, paid off
Number of days delinquent Continuous
Current interest rate Continuous
Current interest rate − national mortgage rate Continuous
Time since origination Continuous
Current balance Continuous
Scheduled principal payment Continuous
Scheduled principal + interest payment Continuous
Number of months the mortgage’s in-
terest been less than the national mort-
gage rate and the mortgage did not pre-
pay
Continuous
Number of occurrences of current in
past 12 months
0-12
Number of occurrences of 30 days delin-
quent in past 12 months
0-12
Number of occurrences of 60 days delin-
quent in past 12 months
0-12
Number of occurrences of 90+ days
delinquent in past 12 months
0-12
Number of occurrences of Foreclosed in
past 12 months
0-12
Table 5: Loan-level performance features (from CoreLogic).
43
Product type Percent of Total Percent of Subprime Percent of Prime
Fixed Rate 80.6 % 48 % 86.3 %
ARM 11.7 % 29 % 8.7 %
GPM (graduated payment) .01 % 0 % .01 %
Balloon Unknown .9 % 1 % .9 %
Balloon 5 .03 % 0 % .03 %
Balloon 7 .03 % .004 % .04 %
Balloon 10 .004 % .006 % .004 %
Balloon 15/30 .2 % 1.07 % .005 %
ARM Balloon .2 % 1.3 % .01 %
Balloon Other .7 % 3.3 % .26 %
Two Step Unknown .02 % 0 % .02 %
Two Step 10/20 .003 % 0 % .003 %
GPARM .002 % 0 % .002 %
Hybrid 2/1 1 % 6.7 % 0 %
Hybrid 3/1 .63 % 2.2 % .35 %
Hybrid 5/1 1.9 % .22 % 2.2 %
Hybrid 7/1 .5 % .005 % .64 %
Hybrid 10/1 .24 % .02 % .28 %
Hybrid Other .02 % .02 % .02 %
Other .7 % 4.3 % .01 %
Invalid data .18 % .6 % .11 %
Table 6: Types of mortgages for full dataset, subprime subset, and prime subset.
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Feature Values
Monthly zip code median house price per square feet (Zillow) Continuous
Monthly zip code average house price (Zillow) Continuous
Zillow zip code house price change since origination Continuous
Monthly state unemployment rate (BLS) Continuous
Yearly county unemployment rate (BLS) Continuous
Original interest rate - National mortgage rate (Freddie Mac) Continuous
Original interest rate - National mortgage rate at origination (Freddie Mac) Continuous
Number of months where interest rate is < nat’l mortgage rate (Freddie Mac) Continuous
Median income in same zip code (Powerlytics) Continuous
Total number of prime mortgages in same zip code (CoreLogic) Continuous
Lagged subprime default rate in same zip code (CoreLogic) Continuous
Lagged prime default rate in same zip code (CoreLogic) Continuous
Lagged prime paid off rate in same zip code (CoreLogic) Continuous
Table 7: Local and national economic risk factors. Data sources in parentheses. “Default
rate” is taken to be the states foreclosure or REO.
Current/Next Current 30 days 60 days 90+ days Foreclosure REO Paid Off
Current 93 4.7 0 0 .01 .002 2
30 days 30 45 23 0 .2 .004 2
60 days 11 16 35 32 5 .01 1.5
90+ days 4 1 2 82 9 .3 2.2
Foreclosure 2 .4 .3 6.5 85 4 1.4
REO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Paid off 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 8: Monthly transition matrix for subprime data. Probabilities are given in percentages.
Current/Next Current 30 days 60 days 90+ days Foreclosure REO Paid Off
Current 97.1 1.3 0 0 .001 .0002 1.57
30 days 34.6 44.4 19 0 .004 .003 1.82
60 days 12 16.8 34.5 34 1.6 .009 1.1
90+ days 4.1 1.4 2.6 80.2 10 .3 1.3
Foreclosure 1.9 .3 .1 6.8 87 2.5 1.3
REO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Paid off 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 9: Monthly transition matrix for prime data. Probabilities are given in percentages.
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Current/Next Current 30 days 60 days 90+ days Foreclosure REO Paid Off
Current 96.7 1.6 0 0 .002 .0004 1.61
30 days 34.2 44.5 19.3 0 .02 .003 1.84
60 days 12 16.7 34.5 33.8 1.9 .009 1.1
90+ days 4.1 1.4 2.5 80.4 9.9 .3 1.3
Foreclosure 1.9 .3 .1 6.8 86.8 2.6 1.3
REO 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
Paid off 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Table 10: Monthly transition matrix for full dataset. Probabilities are given in percentages.
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Variable Test Loss
State unemployment rate 1.160
Current outstanding balance .303
Original interest rate .233
FICO score .204
Number of times 30dd in last 12 months .179
Number of times current in last 12 months .175
Original loan balance .175
Total days delinquent ≥ 160 .171
Vintage year < 1995 .171
Prime mortgage flag .171
Lien type = first lien .171
Original interest rate - national mortgage rate .170
LTV ratio .169
Burnout (number of months where it was optimal to prepay but did not) .168
Time since origination .168
Current interest rate - national mortgage rate .168
Number of times 60dd in last 12 months .168
Number of times foreclosure in last 12 months .168
Number of days delinquent .168
Product type = Fixed Rate Loan .168
Not a convertible loan .168
Number of times 90+ days delinquent in last 12 months .168
Lagged prime prepayment rate in same zip code .168
Zillow zip code housing price change since origination .168
No pool insurance .168
Channel = corresponded lender .168
Documentation = full documentation .168
Number of units ≤ 5 .168
Loan type = conventional loan .168
...
...
Table 11: This table reports a leave-one-out analysis for the explanatory power of the vari-
ables (performed using 5-layer neural network). For each variable, a leave-one-out test is
performed: the variable is removed from the model and the model’s negative average log-
likelihood is evaluated on the test dataset in the absence of the covariate (this is the test loss).
Specifically, the leave-one-out variable is set to 0 for all data samples in the test dataset and
the model’s log-likelihood is calculated using the reduced variable vector. Then, the variable
is replaced in the model, and a leave-one-out test is performed on a new variable. Removing
the variable of course reduces the accuracy of the model, and the test loss becomes larger.
If a particular variable has strong explanatory power, the test loss will significantly increase.
The test loss when no variables are dropped (complete model) is .167.
47
Variable Gradient
Current Outstanding Balance 0.1878
Original Loan Balance 0.0856
Original Interest Rate 0.0503
Current Interest Rate - National Mortgage Rate 0.0478
Original Interest Rate - National Mortgage Rate 0.0463
Zillow Zip Code Housing Price Change Since Origination 0.0386
Number of Times 30 Days Delinquent in Last 12 Months 0.0384
Scheduled Interest and Principle Due 0.0364
Number of Times 60 Days Delinquent in Last 12 Months 0.0362
Zillow zip code median house price change since origination 0.0346
Time Since Origination 0.0306
ARM First Rate Reset Period 0.0295
FICO Score 0.0293
Lagged Prime Prepayment Rate in Same Zip Code 0.0292
Number of Times 90+ Days Delinquent in Last 12 Months 0.0237
Current Interest Rate - Original Interest Rate 0.0228
State Unemployment Rate 0.0214
Number of Days Delinquent 0.0195
ARM periodic rate cap 0.0191
Lagged Prime Default Rate in Same Zip Code 0.0190
Total Number of Prime Mortgages in Same Zip Code 0.0190
Number of Times Current in Last 12 Months 0.0145
Original Appraised Value 0.0132
Original Interest Rate - National Mortgage Rate at Origination 0.0129
LTV Ratio 0.0116
Lagged Default Rate for Subprime Mortgages in Same Zip Code 0.0115
...
...
Table 12: Variable sensitivity analysis. We report the average absolute gradient for transition
current → paid off. Performed using 5-layer neural network.
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Variable Gradient
Number of Times 30 Days Delinquent in Last 12 Months 0.0650
FICO Score 0.0445
Number of Times 60 Days Delinquent in Last 12 Months 0.0334
Current Outstanding Balance 0.0320
Original Loan Balance 0.0285
Original Interest Rate 0.0235
Zillow Zip Code Housing Price Change Since Origination 0.0187
Original Interest Rate - National Mortgage Rate 0.0170
Number of Times 90+ Days Delinquent in Last 12 Months 0.0145
Lagged Prime Default Rate in Same Zip Code 0.0116
Number of Times Foreclosed in Last 12 Months 0.0109
Zillow zip code median house price change since origination 0.0108
Number of Days Delinquent 0.0095
Number of Times Current in Last 12 Months 0.0088
Time Since Origination 0.0087
Current Interest Rate - Original Interest Rate 0.0087
Lagged Prime Prepayment Rate in Same Zip Code 0.0074
ARM Rate Reset Frequency 0.0070
Total Number of Prime Mortgages in Same Zip Code 0.0068
Current Interest Rate - National Mortgage Rate 0.0065
State Unemployment Rate 0.0060
Scheduled Interest and Principle Due 0.0050
LTV Ratio 0.0050
Lagged Default Rate for Subprime Mortgages in Same Zip Code 0.0050
Original Term of the Loan 0.0041
...
...
Table 13: Variable sensitivity analysis. We report the average absolute gradient for transition
current → 30 days delinquent. Performed using 5-layer neural network.
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Most Important Pairs of Variables Gradient
Original interest rate, State unemployment rate 1.33× 10−3
Original interest Rate, Number of times current in past 12 months 1.21× 10−3
Original interest rate, Original term of the loan 0.87× 10−3
FICO score, Original interest rate 0.86× 10−3
Number of times current in past 12 months, Original term of the loan 0.69× 10−3
State unemployment rate, Original term of the loan 0.67× 10−3
...
...
Table 14: Analysis of pairwise variable interactions. We report the average absolute gradient
for transition current → paid off. Performed using 5-layer neural network.
Most Important Triplets of Variables Gradient
Original interest rate, FICO score, State unemployment rate 7.52× 10−4
Original interest Rate, State unemployment rate, 5.31× 10−4
Original interest rate - National mortgage rate
Original loan balance, Original interest rate, State unemployment rate 4.78× 10−4
Original loan balance, Original interest rate, FICO score 4.53× 10−4
Current outstanding balance, Original interest rate, State unemployment rate 3.72× 10−4
Original loan balance, FICO score, State unemployment rate 3.71× 10−4
...
...
Table 15: Analysis of interactions between three variables. We report the average absolute
gradient for transition current → paid off. Performed using 5-layer neural network.
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Most Important Pairs of Variables Gradient
FICO score, Original term of the loan 1.68× 10−3
Original interest rate, Original term of the loan 1.28× 10−3
Number of times current in last 12 months, Original term of the loan 1.27× 10−3
State unemployment rate, Original term of the loan 0.91× 10−3
Original term of the loan, Scheduled Principle Due (missing value) 0.66× 10−3
Original term of the loan, Number of IO months (missing value 0.66× 10−3
...
...
Table 16: Analysis of pairwise variable interactions. We report the average absolute gradient
for transition current → 30 days delinquent. Performed using 5-layer neural network.
Most Important Triplets of Variables Gradient
FICO score, Original interest rate, Number of times current in last 12 months 2.10× 10−4
FICO score, Original interest rate, 1.82× 10−4
Original interest rate - National mortgage rate
FICO score, Current outstanding balance, Original interest rate 1.60× 10−4
FICO score, Original loan balance, Original interest rate 1.57× 10−4
FICO score, Current outstanding balance, Original loan balance 1.30× 10−4
Current Outstanding balance, Original loan balance, Original interest rate 1.27× 10−4
...
...
Table 17: Analysis of interactions between three variables. We report the average abso-
lute gradient for transition current → 30 days delinquent. Performed using 5-layer neural
network.
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Model In-sample Loss Out-of-sample Loss Out-of-sample Loss LR Score
w/o Dropout w/o Dropout with Dropout
0 hidden layer .1840 .1805 .1805 N/A
1 hidden layer .1680 .1700 .1685 1.006× 108
3 hidden layer .1644 .1679 .1671 2.264× 107
5 hidden layer .1639 .1684 .1670 3.145× 106
7 hidden layer .1638 .1688 .1673 6.290× 105
Ensemble .1640 .1659 .1654 N/A
Table 18: In-sample and out-of-sample loss (negative average log-likelihood) for neural net-
works of different depth. The ensemble is composed of eight 5-layer networks. The LR Score
is the likelihood ratio test statistic, given by twice the difference between the in-sample
log-likelihood of the alternative model and the in-sample log-likelihood of the null model.
We test a more complex model (alternative) against the simpler one (null); for example,
1.006 × 108 is the score for a test of the 1 hidden layer network against the 0 hidden layer
network. All tests reported are significant at the 99% level.
Model C→P 30dd→P 60dd→P 90+dd→P F→P
0 hidden layer .65 .77 .68 .59 .57
1 hidden layer .72 .79 .71 .76 .68
3 hidden layer .74 .81 .73 .79 .72
5 hidden layer .74 .81 .73 .79 .73
Ensemble .76 .83 .74 .79 .74
Table 19: Out-of-sample AUC for various transitions to paid off (i.e., prepayment) for neural
networks of different depth. The ensemble is composed of eight 5-layer networks. “P” stands
for paid off, “dd” stands for days delinquent, and “F” stands for foreclosure. The AUC for
transition u → P is the AUC for the two-way classification of whether the mortgage is in
state P or not in state P at a 1-month horizon conditional on the mortgage currently being
in state u.
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State/Portfolio 0-Layer Neural Network 5-Layer Neural Network
REO 0.00 0.00
Paid off 0.83 0.36
Current 98.71 99.25
30 dd 0.46 0.39
60 dd 0.00 0.00
90+ dd 0.00 0.00
Foreclosure 0.01 0.00
Table 20: Percent of portfolio which is in each state at a 1 month time horizon. Portfolios
have size N = 20, 000 and are chosen from an available pool of 100, 000 mortgages.
State/Portfolio 0-Layer Neural Network 5-Layer Neural Network
REO 0.03 0.02
Paid off 8.14 4.06
Current 89.09 93.28
30 dd 1.54 1.60
60 dd 0.36 0.36
90+ dd 0.54 0.49
Foreclosure 0.30 0.19
Table 21: Percent of portfolio which is in each state at a 1 year time horizon. Portfolios have
size N = 20, 000 and are chosen from an available pool of 100, 000 mortgages.
0-Layer Neural Network 5-Layer Neural Network
Avg. Actual Prepayments 1723.8 1723.8
Avg. Predicted Prepayments 2853.8 1456.9
Avg. Absolute Gap 1186.0 278.5
Avg. Standardized Gap 2.4 1.9
Table 22: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level distribution. The table reports averages
for 50 random test portfolios. “Avg. Predicted Prepayments” is the average across 50
test portfolios of the mean of the forecast distribution. The “Avg. Absolute Gap” is the
absolute difference between the predicted and the actual number of prepayments. The
“Avg. Standardized Gap” is the difference between the predicted and the actual number of
prepayments measured in multiples of the forecast standard deviation.
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Figure 4: Empirical monthly prepayment rate versus FICO score. The figure shows that the
prepayment rate has a significant nonlinear relationship with the FICO score of the borrower.
The propensity to prepay is less for borrowers with lower FICO scores but it plateaus once
the score crosses a threshold of about 500 points. This reinforces the need for a model family
that is capable of learning nonlinear functions of the data.
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Figure 5: Empirical monthly prepayment rate versus time since origination (loan age). The
figure shows that the prepayment rate has a significant nonlinear relationship with the age
of the mortgage. Several spikes in the rate occur at 1, 2, and 3 years. These might be due
to the expiration of prepayment penalties or ARM and hybrid mortgages having rate resets.
Many of the subprime mortgages started with low teaser rates and would later jump to
higher rates; borrowers would refinance to avoid these rate jumps.
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Figure 6: Empirical monthly prepayment rate versus loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at origination.
The figure shows that the prepayment rate has a significant nonlinear relationship with the
LTV ratio. One should expect this curve to have a downward slope since a loan with high
LTV will have lesser opportunities to refinance due to a large loan amount relative to the
value of the asset. This trend is observed in the data, albeit with significant nonlinearity as
seen in the figure.
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Figure 7: Nonlinear Relationships between Prepayment and Covariates.
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Figure 8: Nonlinear Relationships between Delinquency and Covariates.
58
100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000
Current Outstanding Balance
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Or
ig
in
al
 L
oa
n 
Ba
la
nc
e
0.000
0.008
0.016
0.024
0.032
0.040
0.048
0.056
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000
Current Outstanding Balance
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Cu
rre
nt
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
- N
at
io
na
l M
or
tg
ag
e 
Ra
te
0.000
0.015
0.030
0.045
0.060
0.075
0.090
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
State Unemployment Rate
0
2
4
6
8
10
Or
ig
in
al
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0.125
0.150
0.175
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Original Term of the Loan
0
2
4
6
8
10
Nu
m
be
r o
f T
im
es
 C
ur
re
nt
 in
 L
as
t 1
2 
M
on
th
s
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
0.022
0.024
0.026
0.028
0.030
0.032
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
0 2 4 6 8 10
Original Interest Rate
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Or
ig
in
al
 L
oa
n 
Ba
la
nc
e
0.000
0.015
0.030
0.045
0.060
0.075
0.090
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
0 2 4 6 8 10
Original Interest Rate
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Cu
rre
nt
 O
ut
st
an
di
ng
 B
al
an
ce
0.000
0.015
0.030
0.045
0.060
0.075
0.090
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
0 2 4 6 8 10
Original Interest Rate
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Cu
rre
nt
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
- N
at
io
na
l M
or
tg
ag
e 
Ra
te
0.000
0.015
0.030
0.045
0.060
0.075
0.090
0.105
0.120
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000
Original Loan Balance
10.0
7.5
5.0
2.5
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
Cu
rre
nt
 In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
- N
at
io
na
l M
or
tg
ag
e 
Ra
te
0.000
0.015
0.030
0.045
0.060
0.075
0.090
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 T
ra
ns
iti
on
 to
 P
ai
d 
Of
f
Figure 9: Relationship between prepayment and pairs of covariates.
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Figure 10: Relationship between Prepayment and Triplets of Covariates
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Figure 11: Relationship between original interest rate, original interest rate - national mort-
gage rate, and state unemployment rate.
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Figure 12: Relationship between delinquency and pairs of covariates.
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Figure 13: Relationship between Delinquency and Triplets of Covariates
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Figure 14: Relationship between FICO score, Original interest rate, and Number of times
current in last 12 months.
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Figure 15: Out-of-sample loss (negative average log-likelihood) versus number of neural
networks in the ensemble. The figure shows the improvement in the out-of-sample loss, an
indicator of the performance of the ensemble, as the number of independently trained models
in the ensemble are increased. Note that each model in an ensemble is a 5-layer neural net-
work that is trained with bootstrapped data and random initialization chosen independently
of that for other models. The predictions from all models within an ensemble are averaged
to produce a low-variance estimate of transition probabilities, so the computational effort in-
creases linearly with the ensemble size. The figure shows that the gains beyond an ensemble
size of 8 are marginal and may not justify using bigger ensembles due to the computational
burden.
65
Figure 16: Out-of-sample AUCs for the 0-layer neural network (i.e., linear logistic regression)
model. The AUC matrix above offers the most granular view into model performance.For
mortgages in state u in the current month, the AUC for event u → v is the AUC for the
two-way classification of whether the mortgage will be in state v or not next month. A
higher value, depicted by a darker color, indicates better performance.
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Figure 17: Out-of-sample AUCs for the 1-layer neural network. The AUC matrix above offers
the most granular view into model performance. For mortgages in state u in the current
month, the AUC for event u → v is the AUC for the two-way classification of whether the
mortgage will be in state v or not next month. A higher value, depicted by a darker color,
indicates better performance. We see marked improvement in the AUC values in going from
the 0-layer model to the 1-layer network, especially for transitions to foreclosure and paid
off as well as for the transitions from the delinquent states to current.
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Figure 18: Out-of-sample AUCs for the 3-layer neural network. The AUC matrix above offers
the most granular view into model performance. For mortgages in state u in the current
month, the AUC for event u → v is the AUC for the two-way classification of whether the
mortgage will be in state v or not next month. A higher value, depicted by a darker color,
indicates better performance. We see further improvement in the AUC values in going from
the shallow networks to the deeper networks.
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Figure 19: Out-of-sample AUCs for the 5-layer neural network. The AUC matrix above offers
the most granular view into model performance. For mortgages in state u in the current
month, the AUC for event u → v is the AUC for the two-way classification of whether the
mortgage will be in state v or not next month. A higher value, depicted by a darker color,
indicates better performance. We see further improvement in the AUC values in going from
the 3-layer network to the 5-layer network.
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Figure 20: Out-of-sample AUCs for an ensemble of independently trained 5-layer neural
networks. The AUC matrix above offers the most granular view into model performance.
For mortgages in state u in the current month, the AUC for event u → v is the AUC for
the two-way classification of whether the mortgage will be in state v or not next month. A
higher value, depicted by a darker color, indicates better performance. In going from the
5-layer neural network to their ensemble, every transition in the matrix sees an improvement
in prediction.
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Figure 21: Out-of-sample ROC curves for various models for the transition current → paid
off. The ROC curve corresponding to the ensemble dominates the curves for the individual
networks, which in turn dominate the curve for the 0-layer (logistic regression) model. This
implies that for those mortgages that are presently in the current state, predicting whether
the state next month would be paid off or not is best predicted by the ensemble, followed
by the networks with at least one layer, and then by the 0-layer model. Further, the gap
between the curves for the 0-layer model and those for the deep neural networks indicates
the significant gain in predictive power due to the modeling of more complex nonlinear
relationships obtained by adding multiple hidden layers to the model.
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Figure 22: Comparison of out-of-sample performance for 5-layer network portfolio and 0-layer
network portfolio for 1-month (top) and 1-year (bottom) ahead horizon. From a random pool
of 100, 000 loans, an investor selects N loans so as to maximize the number of loans (out of
these N) that remain current after one (twelve) months. This requires ranking the loans on
their probability of remaining current in the next month (year) and then selecting the top
N loans. This ranking is obtained for two models, and the number of loans selected, N , is
varied from 0 to 100, 000. The figure shows for each portfolio size N (expressed as percent
of the pool size) on the x-axis the corresponding number of loans that are not current in the
subsequent month (year) on the y-axis. The portfolio constructed using the 5-layer neural
network yields superior performance for all portfolio sizes. Note that the curves intersect at
the end points by design, since the portfolios selected for N = 0 (no loans) and N = 100, 000
(entire pool of loans) are identical.
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Figure 23: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level predictions of the 5-layer network and the
0-layer model. A pool of 2 million mortgages is grouped into 2, 000 portfolios by ordering
loans according to the borrowers’ FICO score and then sequentially packaging every 1,000
loans into individual portfolios. For each such portfolio, the figure shows the observed
number of prepayments in the next 12 months on the x-axis and the predicted number of
prepayments in the next 12 months from the two models, the 5-layer neural network and
the logistic regression model, on the y-axis. The x = y line (in black) shows the ideal but
hypothetical scenario under which the predicted and the observed number of prepayments
coincide. It is seen that the predictions from the 5-layer neural network are much closer to
this ideal line than those from the 0-layer model.
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Figure 24: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level predictions of the 5-layer neural network
and the logistic regression model. A pool of 2 million mortgages is grouped into 2, 000
portfolios by ordering loans according to their initial interest rate and then sequentially
packaging every 1,000 loans into individual portfolios. For each such portfolio, the figure
shows the observed number of prepayments in the next 12 months on the x-axis and the
predicted number of prepayments in the next 12 months from the two models, the 5-layer
neural network and the logistic regression model, on the y-axis. The x = y line (in black)
shows the ideal but hypothetical scenario under which the predicted and the observed number
of prepayments coincide. It is seen that the predictions from the 5-layer neural network are
much closer to this ideal line than those from the logistic regression model.
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Figure 25: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level predictions of the 5-layer neural network
and the logistic regression model. A pool of 2 million mortgages is grouped into 2, 000
portfolios by ordering loans according to their loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and then sequentially
packaging every 1,000 loans into individual portfolios. For each such portfolio, the figure
shows the observed number of prepayments in the next 12 months on the x-axis and the
predicted number of prepayments in the next 12 months from the two models, the 5-layer
neural network and the logistic regression model, on the y-axis. The x = y line (in black)
shows the ideal but hypothetical scenario under which the predicted and the observed number
of prepayments coincide. It is seen that the predictions from the 5-layer neural network are
much closer to this ideal line than those from the logistic regression model.
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Figure 26: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level predictions of the 5-layer neural network
and the logistic regression model. A pool of 2 million mortgages is grouped into 2, 000
portfolios by ordering loans according to their probability of being current after 12 months
and then sequentially packaging every 1,000 loans into individual portfolios. For each such
portfolio, the figure shows the observed number of prepayments in the next 12 months on
the x-axis and the predicted number of prepayments in the next 12 months from the two
models, the 5-layer neural network and the logistic regression model, on the y-axis. The
x = y line (in black) shows the ideal but hypothetical scenario under which the predicted
and the observed number of prepayments coincide. It is seen that the predictions from the 5-
layer neural network are much closer to this ideal line than those from the logistic regression
model. It is important to note here that the loans were ordered on their probability of being
current after 12 months, where this probability is estimated using the logistic regression
model. If the estimated probabilities were accurate, the portfolios so obtained would have
large variations in quality with the observed number of prepayments covering the entire x-
axis (as in previous plots) as well as the logistic regression model would see an increasing
curve; however, neither of these trends is observed, implying that the predicted probabilities
are inaccurate.
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Figure 27: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level distribution from the 5-layer neural net-
work and the logistic regression model. The distribution of the number of prepayments at a
12-month horizon is obtained by simulating several trajectories for the time-varying covari-
ates and then computing the transition probabilities for each loan for every trajectory; this
approach is described in Section 3. For a wide range of portfolios, we observe that the gap
between the mean of the distribution and the actual number of prepayments is lesser for the
neural network model than for the logistic regression model.
Figure 28: Comparison of out-of-sample pool-level distribution from the 5-layer neural net-
work and the logistic regression model. The distribution of the number of prepayments at a
12-month horizon is obtained by simulating several trajectories for the time-varying covari-
ates and then computing the transition probabilities for each loan for every trajectory; this
approach is described in Section 3. For a wide range of portfolios, we observe that the gap
between the mean of the distribution and the actual number of prepayments is lesser for the
neural network model than for the logistic regression model.
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